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Why Can't a Chicken Vote For Colonel Sanders?
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton and
the Constitutionality of Term Limits
I. INTRODUCTION
Representative Bob Ingils of South Carolina once said that "asking
Congress to vote for term limits is a bit like asking chickens to vote for
Colonel Sanders."' Although the Representative's quote speaks only of
congressionally imposed limits, his words are just as applicable to term
limits imposed by voters. In the current political arena, where the pow-
er to bring money back to a legislator's home district is proportionate
to his or her seniority,2 voters adopting term limits for their own repre-
sentatives seem to be committing the political suicide described by Rep-
resentative Ingils. Nevertheless, voters from more than twenty states
have done just that, enacting term limits on their federal representatives
in Congress.'
These voters took action because they were frustrated with the "cy-
cle of incumbency" of the current system.4 In this cycle, a resource-rich
incumbent5 discourages others from running, and potential contributors
1. Holly Idelson, Constitutional Amendment: Ruling Pressures Congress to Ad-
dress Term Limits, CONG. Q. WKLY. REP., May 31, 1995, at 1479, 1482.
2. Ronald D. Rotunda, Speech, Rethinking Term Limits for Federal Legislators in
Light of the Structure of the Constitution, 73 OR. I. REv. 561, 563-66 (1994).
3. Kathleen Sullivan, Comment, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 109 HARV. L REV. 78, 78 (1995). Twenty-two states have term limits for
their members of Congress, and 21 of these were passed by ballot initiative. U.S.
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1909 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., COLO. CONsT. art. XVIII, § 9(a) (limiting U.S. Senators to two consecutive
terms and Representatives to six consecutive terms); MICH. CONST. art. II, § 10 (pre-
venting U.S. Representatives from serving three times in 12 years and U.S. Senators
from serving more than twice in 24 years); WYO. STAT. § 22-5-104 (1977 & Supp.
1993) (denying acceptance of nomination petitions from anyone serving as U.S. Sena-
tor for 12 or more years in a 24-year period or as U.S. Representative for six or
more years in any 12-year period).
4. Blair T. O'Connor, Want to Limit Congressional Terms? Vote for "None of the
Above," 29 VAL U. L REV. 361, 363-64 n.10 (1994).
5. These resources include a federally funded campaign staff, use of the franking
privilege, use of a photography and recording studio, free television coverage (cable
and volunteers give those who do run little support in light of what
they see as a losing candidacy. 6 Voters at the polls then inevitably re-
elect the incumbent, either because the incumbent runs unopposed, or
because they view the other candidate as a weak "sacrificial lamb," put
on the ballot merely as a place-holder by the opposing party.7 Term
limits cut off this incumbency cycle and express the electorate's an-
noyance with entrenched incumbents who "paralyze congressional will,"
"frustrate change," and pass only "'special interest legislation,' operating
'to the detriment of [the] state.'"8
In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, the Supreme Court faced the
question of whether it was within the power of state voters to vent
their frustration through term limits. Although sympathizing with the
voters, the Court held that states lack the power to enact term limits
under the Tenth Amendment and that term limits improperly impose a
qualification for Congress in addition to those the majority deemed
exclusive under Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution.°
Part IU of this Note examines the historic interpretation of the Qualifi-
cations Clauses, the Court's reaction to ballot access cases," and the
application of the Tenth Amendment. 2 Parts HI and IV summarize the
facts of the case and the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions
of U.S. Term Limits.3 Part V contains a critical analysis of the majori-
telecast of floor debates), the ability to give out government benefits to district vot-
ers, and campaign financing laws that are structured in their favor by encouraging
donations from large PACs and special interest groups to incumbents. See 2 U.S.C.
§§ 61-1, 72(a), 332 (federally funded staff); 39 U.S.C. § 3210 (franking privilege); U.S.
Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1911 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (use of government photo
and recording studio, federally funded staff); Brief for Petitioners U.S. Term Limits,
Inc. at 19-20 & n.25, US. Term Limits (Nos. 93-1456, 93-1828) (television coverage);
O'Connor, supra note 4, at 371-72 (use of government benefits and campaign financ-
ing laws).
6. O'Connor, supra note 4, at 363-64 n.10.
7. Id. In 1988, more members of Congress left office because of death than be-
cause they lost at the polls. Dwayne A- Vance, Comment, State Imposed Congressio-
nal Term Limits, What Would the Framers of the Constitution Say? 1994 B.Y.U. L.
REv. 429, 439 (citing William Kristol, Term Limitations: Breaking Up the Iron Trian-
gte, 16 HARV. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 95, 97 (1993)).
8. Mark Killenbeck & Steve Sheppard, Another Such Victory? Term Limits, Sec-
tion 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Right to Representation, 45 HASTINGS
LJ. 1121, 1134 (1994) (brackets in original) (quoting Preamble-Laws 1993, ch. 1, re-
printed in WASH. REv. CODE § 43.01.015 (1993) (Initiative Measure No. 573 approved
Nov. 3, 1992)).
9. 115 S. Ct 1842 (1995).
10. Id. at 1856, 1871.
11. A ballot access case arises when a state statute or constitutional amendment
burdens a candidate's attempt to have his name put on the ballot. Id, at 1913
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
12. See infra notes 18-82 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 83-185 and accompanying text Justice Stevens wrote the ma-
[VoL 24: 649, 1997] U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton
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ty opinion. 14 Part VI discusses whether the decision completely fore-
closes a state's power to cut off the "incumbency cycle."5 Part VI also
considers the impact that the decision will have on numerous state
statutes currently in force that, although not term limits, if examined
under the majority's holding, will be declared unconstitutional. This
Note concludes by emphasizing the lack of dichotomy between what
the voters of Arkansas tried to accomplish and the reasoning behind
the Court's decision preventing them. 7
II. HISTORY
The majority and dissenting opinions in U.S. Term Limits discussed
three main areas of law relevant to determining the constitutionality of
the Arkansas amendment: the Qualifications Clauses; 8 the Times, Plac-
es and Manner Clause as applied in ballot access cases; 9 and the
Tenth Amendment.2" This section of the Note examines each of these
areas in turn, pointing out the Court's position and interpretation of
these provisions prior to its decision in U.S. Term Limits.
A. The Qualifications Clauses
Article I, Section 2 of the United States Constitution reads: "No per-
son shall be a Representative who shall not have attained the Age of
twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States,
and who shall not, when elected be an Inhabitant of that State in which
he be chosen."2' Article I, Section 3 contains a similar provision for
senators, but sets the minimum age at thirty years and the citizenship
jority opinion, joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. U.S. Term
Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1845. Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 1872
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia. Id. at 1875 (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing).
14. See infmr notes 186-242 and- accompanying text.
15. See infau notes 243-52 and accompanying text.
16. See isfra notes 253-64 and accompanying text
17. See infra notes 265-73 and accompanying text.
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. I, § 3, cL 3; see iltfra notes 21-48 and
accompanying text.
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 5; see infra notes 49-72 and accompanying text.
20. U.S. CONsT. amend. X; see infra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
requirement at nine years.' Although these Qualifications Clauses pre-
scribe minimum qualifications for Congress members, they are not ex-
pressly exclusive, and thus, the question arises whether the Framers
intended the federal or state government to have the power to supple-
ment them.'
The first time a person's qualifications for Congress beyond those
enumerated in the Constitution arose as an issue post-ratification was
in an incident never presented to the Supreme Court. After losing to
two-time Maryland incumbent William McCreery for a seat in the United
States House of Representatives in 1807, Joshua Barney challenged
McCreery's eligibility for membership based on an 1802 Maryland stat-
ute.' The statute required at least one of the representatives from
McCreery's district to live in Baltimore City, and McCreery had moved
outside the city in 1803.2' A House Committee on Elections issued a
report stating the Maryland law was "contrary to the Constitution of the
United States" because it added a qualification for congressional mem-
bership beyond those enumerated in the Constitution.26 The report cre-
ated so much controversy in the House that the members sent it back
to the Committee, which then held hearings on McCreery's residence.27
The second report sent to Congress read, McCreery, "having the great-
est number of votes, and being duly qualified, agreeably to the Constitu-
tion of the United States, is entitled to his seat in this House."' The
report still appeared to some members to decide that Maryland did not
have the power to add qualifications, and after long debate, the House
approved an amendment stating only that McCreery was "entitled to his
seat in the House."'
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
23. See Daniel H. Lowenstein, Are Congressional Term Limits Constitutional? 18
HARv. J.L & PuB. POL'Y 1, 9 (1994). Lowenstein criticizes several scholarly theories
supporting the constitutionality of congressional term limits, including the idea that by
classifying the limits as a "manner" of elections, states are free to regulate through
limits under the Times, Places and Manner Clause of the Constitution, and also the
theory that the states' power to adopt term limits can be implied from other express
powers granted to the states in the Constitution. Id. at 25-29, 34-56.
24. Roderick M. Hills, A Defense of State Constitutional Limits on Federal Con-
gressional Terms, 53 U. Prrr. L. Rnv. 97, 123 (1991). Hills cites several sources for
his retelling, including 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 1232 (1807), ASHER C. HINDS, PRECEDENTS
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES § 414 (1907), and DIGEST OF CONTESTED ELECTION
CASES 167 (M. St. Clair Clarke & David A. Hall eds., Washington, Gales, and Seaton
1834) (hereinafter CLARKE & HALL). Hills, supra, at 125 nn.110-13.
25. Hills, supra note 24, at 123.
26. Id. at 124.
27. Id,
28. Id. (citing CLARKE & HALL, supra note 24, at 169-71).
29. Id. (citing CLARKE & HALL, supra note 24, at 169-71); see also U.S. Term Lim-
its, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1908-09 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explain-
[Vol. 24: 649, 19971 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton
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Before U.S. Term Limits, the Court had decided very few cases in-
volving the Qualifications Clauses. PoweU v. McCormake° was an ex-
ception, and presented the Court with an opportunity to examine the
Clauses. Adam Clayton Powell was a member-elect of the House of
Representatives who had served during the previous term.3" During the
previous congressional session, a House special subcommittee conclud-
ed that Powell misappropriated government funds, but the subcommit-
tee took no formal action against him.' When the new Congress gath-
ered to take the oath of office, Powell was asked to step aside, and the
members who were sworn and seated subsequently appointed a Select
Committee to determine Powell's eligibility.' Powell refused to attend
any of the Committee's hearings, maintaining that he would give infor-
mation only in relation to his age, citizenship, and residency-the quali-
fications contained in the Constitution. 4 The Committee nevertheless
issued a report stating that although Powell had used government mon-
ey inappropriately, he met the three requirements of the Qualifications
Clauses, and therefore recommended that he be sworn and seated, but
censured, deprived of seniority, and fined.' The House passed most of
ing the nature of the debates surrounding the Committee report). A similar incident
occurred in 1856 when members of the majority Douglasite party challenged the elec-
tion of Illinois Judge Lyman Trumbell for Senator. Hills, supra note 24, at 128-29. An
Illinois statute forbade state judges from running for federal office during their term
on the bench, and although Trumbell resigned his position prior to running, the
Douglasites contended his "term" was not yet over. Id. at 129. Trumbell was eventu-
ally seated, but it remained unclear if he was seated because Congress felt the state
could not add these qualifications, or if Congress merely felt the Illinois Legislature,
in electing Trumbell (the election preceded direct election of senators), interpreted its
own constitution as allowing his election. Id. at 130. The case has not been cited as
precedent for interpretation of the Qualifications Clauses very often because it was
seen more as a partisan move by the Douglasites rather than any substantive debate
on the power of a state to add qualifications. Id, at 131. The Trumbel incident
seems even less authoritative in light of the Courts decision in Clements v. Fashing,
457 U.S. 957 (1982), which upheld a state's right to require state judges to resign in
order to run for U.S. Senate or House of Representatives.
30. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
31. Id. at 489.
32. Id. at 490.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 491; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (enumerating qualifications for
House members).
35. PoweU, 395 U.S. at 492.
the report's recommendations, but added an overriding amendment
stating that Powell be excluded from the House and his seat declared
vacant.'
The controversy eventually reached the Supreme Court, where the
Justices were forced to look at the Qualifications Clauses in deciding
whether the case presented a non-justiciable political question.' The
respondents, arguing on behalf of the House, contended that Article I,
Section 5 of the Constitution36 "textually. committed" the power to
judge the qualifications of House members to Congress, and thus the
decision was not reviewable by the Court.3 The majority agreed that
the Constitution granted this power to the House, but disagreed with
the respondents as to its extent.40 The Court found the Constitution
limited the textual commitment of power to judging a House member's
"qualifications" as set forth in Article I, Section 2: age, citizenship, and
residency.4
In reaching this conclusion, the Court interpreted the Constitution
using historical evidence. The analysis began by looking at precedents
from England and the Colonies prior to the Constitutional Conven-
tion.42 The Court rejected the idea that these incidents supported the
theory that Congress could control the qualifications of its own mem-
bers.' The majority then analyzed the Convention debates and con-
cluded that although subject to other interpretations, the debates ulti-
mately stood for the proposition that the qualifications contained in the
Constitution could not be varied by either branch of Congress.' The
36. Id. at 492-93.
37. Id. at 495, 519. The Court also addressed the issues of inootness, immunity
under the Speech and Debate Clauses of the Constitution, the power of the House to
exclude a member, and subject matter jurisdiction. Id at 495.
38. Article I, § 5 provides, in pertinent part- "Each House shall be the Judge of
the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its Members .... U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 5.
39. Powell, 395 U.S. at 519-20.
40. Id. at 548.
41. Id. All parties agreed that Congress could use the power to "expel" a member
after he was seated for reasons outside the Qualifications Clauses. Id. at 507; see
U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (granting Congress the power to expel a member with a
two-thirds vote).
42. Powel, 395 U.S. at 522-31.
43. Id. at 528. The majority of the Court's analysis discussed John Wilkes, a mem-
ber of the English House of Commons who was excluded because of libel against
the State, but later vindicated and allowed to be seated because the qualifications of
members were "'not occasional but fixed.'" Id. at 527-28 (quoting 16 PAR. HisT. ENG.
589, 590 (1769)). This incident became a rallying cry for American colonists at the
time of the Convention, who saw Wilkes as a symbol of liberty. Id. at 530-31.
44. Id. at 532. The Court pointed to the Convention's rejection of a provision that
would have allowed the Legislature to add a property requirement for members, as
[Vol. 24: 649, 1997] U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton
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final piece of historical evidence the PoweU Court examined was post-
ratification interpretation of the Constitution by Congress itself. The
Court discussed the McCreery incident 5 in addition to several other
attempts by Congress to exclude members for reasons outside the Qual-
ifications Clauses' and concluded that these events were too inconsis-
tent to be of precedential value.".
Based on the conclusions the Court could draw from the historical
evidence and the belief that "[a] fundamental principle of our represen-
tative democracy is... 'that the people should choose whom they
please to govern them,'" the Court concluded that although Congress
could "expel" a member for disorderly behavior after he was seated,
they could not use this power to exclude a duly elected member by
adding qualifications to those enumerated in the Qualifications Claus-
es. 4
well as to the Framers' understanding during the state ratification conventions that
the "qualifications for members of Congress had been fixed in the Constitution." Id.
at 533-36, 540-41. The Court foilowed the line of reasoning used by James Madison
when he argued against the property provision: "'Qualifications founded on artificial
distinctions may be devised, by the stronger in order to keep out partizans of [a
weaker] faction.'" Id, at 534 (alteration in original) (quoting 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDER-
AL CONVENTION OF 1787 249-50 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)) (hereinafter
FARRAND).
45. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text (describing McCreery incident).
Unfortunately, the Powel Court's retelling of the McCreery event failed to state that
Congress had rejected the report which found McCreery was ineligible because the
Qualifications Clauses were exclusive. See PoweU, 395 U.S. at 543; see also U.S Term
Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1908 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting the PoweU Court's
erroneous reporting of the incident).
46. These reasons included criminal behavior and aiding confederate soldiers. Id, at
544-46 *
47. Id,
48. Id. at 547-48 (quoting Alexander Hamilton, 2 DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTI-
TUTION 257 (J. Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1876)) (hereinafter DEBATES); see also Nixon v.
United States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 740 (1993). In Nixon, the Court stated:
Our conclusion in Powell was based on the fixed meaning of "[qjualifications"
set forth in Art I, § 2. The claim by the House that its power to "be the
Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members" . . .
was defeated by the existence of this separate provision specifying the only
qualifications which might be imposed for House membership.
113 S. Ct. at 740.
B. Ballot Access/Times, Places and Manner Cases
The Qualifications Clauses have never been the standard for the
Court when considering cases where a congressional candidate has
been denied access to the ballot prior to the election, as in U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton.9 In Storer v. Brown,W the Court considered
a California statute requiring that independent candidates-as a prereq-
uisite to placing their names on the ballot for the current elec-
tion-disaffiliate from a qualified political party for at least one year
and file a petition signed by a designated percentage of voters from the
last general election.5' Two of the petitioners were candidates for Con-
gress who were registered as Democrats within the year prior to the
election and were thus ineligible under the statute to run.' The candi-
dates challenged the statute based on the First Amendmene and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment'
The Court rejected their argument, noting that the State's interest in
both the "unrestrained factionalism [that] may do significant damage to
the fabric of government" and the "stability of its political system" out-
weighed the candidates' burden of having to make a decision early
enough to disaffiliate as a party member in order to run as an indepen-
dent.' The Court noted that the appellants' argument that the statute
established an additional qualification in violation of the Qualifications
49. See US. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1913 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
50. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
51. Id. at 726-27.
52. Id. at 727-28. The Court discussed the claims of two other petitioners chal-
lenging the statute, candidates for President and Vice President, independently from
those of the congressional candidates because the former did not earn a place on the
ballot due to the statute's signature requirement. Id. at 728.
53. The First Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "The Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech . . or the right of the people to peaceably
assemble . . . ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. L
54. Storer, 415 U.S. at 727. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part:
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immu-
nities of the citizens of the United States . .. nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsr. amend XIV, § 1.
55. Storer, 415 U.S. at 736. The Court cited to the Times, Places and Manner
Clause of Article I, § 4, cl 1, as the State's authority to enact the provision. Id. at
729-30. The Clause reads: "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulation,
except as to the Places of chusing [sic] Senators." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. The
majority further stated that "(a]s a practical matter, there must be a substantial regu-
lation of elections if they are to be fair and honest." Storer, 415 U.S. at 730.
[VoL 24: 649, 19971 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton
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Clauses was "wholly without merit,"' and the candidates "may never-
theless resort to the write-in alternative provided by California law."57
Later ballot restriction cases followed the same course. In Anderson
v. Celebreeze,' a candidate for President challenged an Ohio statute
requiring independents wanting to appear on the ballot to file the nec-
essary nomination petitions in March, six months before the general
election.' The Court stated that the proper inquiry in ballot access
cases is "whether the challenged restriction unfairly or unnecessarily
burdens the 'availability of political opportunity.'"' This analysis be-
gins, the Justices explained, with examining the "character and magni-
tude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Four-
teenth Amendments," which is then weighed against not only the
strength and legitimacy of the interests that the state puts forth as jus-
tification for the regulation, but also the "extent... [these] interests
make it necessary to burden the plaintiffs rights."6' In Anderson, the
Court struck the statute down because the burden on independent can-
didates, as opposed to that on partisan candidates given the same filing
deadline, outweighed the State's interest in voter education, equal treat-
ment, and political stability.' As the Court noted, "'[slometimes the
56. Storer, 415 U.S. at 746 n.16.
57. Id, at 736 n.7.
58. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
59. Id. at 783. Although the Anderson case involved a candidate for President, the
statute applied to all candidates in Ohio, excluding the governor and lieutenant gover-
nor, but including Congress members. See id.
60. Id. at 793 (quoting Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 964 (1982) (plurality
opinion) (quoting Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974))).
61. Id. at 789. The Court based its "conclusions directly on the First and Four-
teenth Amendments and [did] not engage in a separate Equal Protection Clause analy-
sis." Id. at 787 n.7. Instead, the Court relied on earlier cases, such as Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), discussed infra notes 68-72, which "identified the First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights implicated by restrictions . . . and . . . considered
the degree to which the State's restrictions further legitimate state interests." Ander-
son, 460 U.S. at 787 n.7. Although the Anderson Court used a due process analysis,
and not an Equal Protection analysis, other ballot access cases have used the two
"interchangeably." Id. at 789; see Todd J. Zywicid, Federal Judicial Review of State
Ballot Access Regulations: Escape from the Political Thicket, 20 T. MARSHALL L REV.
87, 89 n.2 (1994).
62. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 796, 799, 806. The Court reasoned that Ohio did not
need to establish as early a filing date for independents to ensure voters could ade-
quately get to know the independent candidates because the introduction of modern
media into campaigns made candidate knowledge more easily accessible. Id. at 797-
98. Furthermore, treating independent and partisan candidates equally for the purpos-
grossest discrimination can lie in treating things that are different as
though they were exactly alike.'" '
In Burdick v. Takushi, 4 the Court faced a suit brought by a regis-
tered voter claiming that Hawaii's complete ban on write-in voting vio-
lated his First Amendment rights. Stating that "'the rights of voters and
the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation,'"'
the Court used the standard set forth in Anderson to evaluate the Ha-
waii statute, even though the claim involved voting rights and not a
candidate's ballot access.' The Court concluded that the State's inter-
es of declaring their candidacy created "materially different" burdens and was not
justified for independents, who were not running in the party primary in June and
thus would not even have an opportunity for voters to see their name on a ballot
until November. Id. at 799-800. Finally, the Court addressed the interest advanced by
the State in preventing the limited number of loyal party workers from being drawn
to independent candidacies, which the State contended would result in the factional-
ism the Storer case sought to prevent. Id. at 802-03. The Court stated that the inter-
est upheld in Storer, however, did not allow a political party to "invoke the powers
of the State to assure monolithic control over its own members and supporters." Id.
at 803.
63. Id. at 801 (quoting Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971)) (brackets in
original). In Jenness, the petitioner asked the Court to invalidate a Georgia statute
requiring candidates not participating in a political party primary to file petitions con-
taining signatures of at least 5% of the total number of registered voters in the past
election for the candidate's office, along with a filing fee equal to 5% of the salary of
office the candidate seeks, in order to appear on the general election ballot. Jenness,
403 U.S. at 432. The Court upheld the restriction against claims of violations of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, stating that "Georgia in no way freezes the status
quo, but implicitly recognizes the potential fluidity of American political life." .d. at
439. In comparison to restrictions on ballot access that the Court had not allowed in
the past, the Georgia law allowed "[a]nyone who wishes, and who is otherwise eligi-
ble," to be a candidate for any office in the state, either through the write-in proce-
dure, or via the one prescribed by the Georgia statute. Id. at 438.
64. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
65. Id. at 438 (quoting Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972))
66. Id. at 439; see supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text (discussing Anderson
test). The Burdick decision also seemed to answer the unsettled question of the
proper standard of review for ballot access cases. See Zywicki, supra note 61, at 116.
In one of the earliest ballot access cases, the Court used a "strict scrutiny" standard.
See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968). Yet, the Court later suggested that
application of this standard should be limited primarily to cases involving classifica-
tions based either on wealth or those involving discrimination against minor political
parties. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 964-66 (1982) (plurality opinion). Under
the Burdick rationale, however, the "rigorousness" of the inquiry of the state election
law under the test set forth in Anderson "depends upon the extent to which a chal-
lenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights." Burdick, 504 U.S.
at 434. A strict scrutiny analysis, requiring the regulation to be "'narrowly drawn to
advance a state interest of compelling importance,'" is used if the burden on rights is
"severe." Id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)). On the other hand,
if the election law "imposes only 'reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions' upon
[Vol. 24: 649, 1997] U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton
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est in avoiding "party raiding" (using blocks of voters by one party to
unfairly affect the primary of another party), avoiding factionalism, and
its need to narrow the field of candidates for the general election out-
weighed the slight burden the restriction put on candidates and voters
who were not able to cast write-in ballots.67
The Court has not always upheld state restrictions on ballot access.
In Wi//iams v. Rhodes,' the Court examined several Ohio election
laws that eliminated write-in balloting, mandated candidates show nom-
ination by a "political party," and required independent candidates
wanting to appear on the ballot to file petitions with signatures of at
least fifteen percent of those voting in the last gubernatorial election.'
A political party, as defined by Ohio law, had to go through an elabo-
rate state-wide procedure to qualify under the statute.7" The Court
struck down the "totality of the Ohio restrictive laws" because they
"impose[d] a burden on voting and associational rights which... is an
invidious discrimination, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause."7'
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights," a rational basis standard is used, and "the
State's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justiy' the restric-
tions." Id. (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983)). In Burdick, the
Court applied the less stringent rational basis test. Id. Although the Supreme Court
never explicitly stated the standard it used in either Anderson or Storer, discussed
supra notes 50-63 and accompanying text, its language implied that a strict scrutiny
standard applied. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 805 (1983) ("[T]he early
filing deadline [regulation] is not precisely drawn ... .") (emphasis added); Storer v.
Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974) ("We also consider that interest as not only permis-
sible, but compelling ... ." (emphasis added). For an excellent discussion of the
confusion surrounding the standards usdd by the Court in ballot access cases, see
Zywicld, supra note 61, at 107-16.
67. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 437, 439. The Court reasoned that a Hawaiian candidate
had other reasonable means of qualifying to have his name put on the ballot; for
example, he or she could gather the sensible number of signatures required by the
State and then file nominating papers. Id. at 438. Furthermore, the Court rejected the
petitioner's argument that he had a right to cast a protest vote for Donald Duck, for
elections were not meant to be a "generalized" means for voters to vent "'pique or
personal quarrel[s].'" Id. (quoting Storer, 415 U.S. at 735) (brackets in original).
68. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
69. Id. at 26, 34.
70. Id. at 26. To qualify, the statute required that the party participate in the state
primary election process by electing several members of the party to positions on a
state central committee and as delegates to a national convention. Id at 25 n.1. To
appear on this primary ballot, a candidate needed to (1) prove that he had not voted
in any other party primary during the past four years, and (2) file petitions of en-
dorsement signed by voters not voting in any past election. Id.
71. Id. at 34. The Court used the "strict scrutiny" standard, discussed supra note
The Court rejected the State's argument that the State had an interest
in promoting a two-party system because "[clompetition in ideas and
governmental policies is at the core of our electoral process and of the
First Amendment freedoms," and furthermore the Ohio laws did not
just favor the two particular parties, but gave them a "complete monop-
oly."
72
C. The Tenth Amendment
The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: "The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people."73 These sovereign powers of the states, as described by
James Madison, "'are numerous and indefinite .... The powers re-
served to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the
ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of
the people.'"7' According to the Court, under the Tenth Amendment
the states "'retai[n] a significant measure of sovereign authority'.., to
the extent the Constitution has not divested them of their original pow-
ers and transferred those powers to the Federal Government."75
Like the Qualifications Clauses, before U.S. Term Limits the Court
had never invoked the Tenth Amendment to restrict a state's power to
control elections. Instead, the Court cited the Tenth Amendment as the
authority for the states' power to put qualifications on their own offi-
cers and to control their own elections. In Gregory v. Ashcroft," the
Court upheld a Missouri Constitution provision requiring state judges to
retire at age seventy.7 The decision cited a line of cases that the ma-
jority stated represented "the authority of the people of the States to
determine the qualifications of their most important government offi-
cials.... It is a power reserved to the States under the Tenth Amend-
ment and guaranteed them by that provision of the Constitution under
66, requiring a compelling state interest to justify the regulation. Wi//iams, 393 U.S.
at 31.
72. Id. at 31-32. The Court also struck down several other interests put forth by
the State, including preventing voter confusion and ensuring the winner was the ma-
jority vote-getter, because the interests did not justify the "very severe restrictions
on . . . rights which Ohio has imposed." I& at 32.
73. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
74. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45,
at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
75. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549 (1985) (quoting
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 269 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting)).
76. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
77. Id. at 470.
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which the United States 'guarantee[s] to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government.'"'
From this line of precedent, a line of governmental authority can be
drawn. At the federal level, Congress may not alter the qualifications for
its members, but it may alter the times, places, and manner of their
election.' At the state level, a state may alter the qualifications of its
state officers, and may regulate the times, places, and manner of the
election of both its federal and state officers.' Furthermore, in exer-
cising its powers, a state may place burdens on the constitutional rights
of both voters and candidates, so long as the burden does not outweigh
the legitimate state interest justifying the burden."s Yet these conclu-
sions left open the question presented in U.S. Term Limits: Whether a
state has the power to impose term limits on its federal officers either
through altering their qualifications or by regulating congressional elec-
tions."
Im. FACTS OF THE CASE
In November of 1993, by almost a sixty percent majority, the voters
of Arkansas approved Amendment 73 to their state constitution.'
Amendment 73 provided quasi-term limits for both state and federal
elected officials--although a federal incumbent's name could not appear
on the ballot, he could win re-election as a write-in candidate.' The
initiative's preamble included a statement that the people of Arkansas
78. Id. at 463 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4). The case decided that state judges
were not within the protection afforded by the Federal Age Discrimination Act, and
furthermore, that the Missouri mandatory retirement proviso did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause. Id. at 473. Twenty states have similarly used the Tenth Amend-
ment power to put term limits on their state executive officers, and 34 have also put
limits on state legislators. Brief for the State Petitioner at 24, US. Term Limits (Nos.
93-1456, 93-1828); see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 134-35 (1970) (stating "Our
judgments also save for the States the power to control state and local elections
which the Constitution originally reserved to them and which no subsequent amend-
ment has taken from them."); Maloney v. McCartney, 223 S.E.2d 607 (W. Va.) (holding
state constitutional provision limiting governor to two consecutive terms constitution-
al), appeal dismissed, 425 U.S. 946 (1976).
79. See supra notes 24-48 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 49-78 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 49-78 and accompanying text.
82. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1847 (1995).
83. Id. at 1875 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 1845-46.
believed their incumbent elected officials had become "preoccupied
with reelection" and thus had "ignore[d] their duties as representa-
tives."' The limits prevented members of the House of Representatives
already serving three terms, and members of the Senate having served
two terms, from having their names appear on the ballot'w Ten days
after the amendment passed, Bobbie Hill, on behalf of the-people of
Arkansas and the League of Women Voters, fied suit asking for a de-
claratory judgment that the section dealing with federal officials was
unconstitutional. 7 The suit named several state officials and the state
divisions of the Republican and Democratic parties as defendants.'
The State's Attorney General intervened in support of the named defen-
dants, as did various other proponents of the amendment including the
petitioner, a political group promoting term limits.' After the circuit
court issued a ruling that the section violated Article I of the United
States Constitution,'9 the defendants appealed to the Arkansas Su-
preme Court, which affirmed the lower court decision.9 A plurality of
the Arkansas high court concluded that the Qualifications Clauses were
exclusive, and that allowing a state to add its own requirements for
membership would undermine the uniformity that was the "tenor and
fabric" of congressional representation. 2 Furthermore, the plurality did
85. Id. at 1845. The full preamble read:
The people of Arkansas find and declare that elected officials who remain in
office too long become preoccupied with reelection and ignore their duties as
representatives of the people. Entrenched incumbency has reduced voter par-
ticipation and has led to an electoral system that is less free, less competi-
tive, and less representative than the system established by the Founding Fa-
thers. Therefore, the people of Arkansas, exercising their reserved powers,
herein limit the terms of the elected officials.
Id.
86. Id. at 1845-46. The amendment also prevented any service in the same office
by a state executive after two four-year terms, by a state representative after three
two-year terms, and by a state senator after two four-year terms. Id. The Arkansas
Supreme Court severed the provision regarding federal officers from the rest of the
amendment and upheld the constitutionality of the term limits on state officials. U.S.
Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 872 S.W.2d 349, 359 (Ark. 1994), affd sub nom. U.S. Term
Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1842. Only the federal provision was before the United States
Supreme Court in U.S. Term Limits. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1846.
87. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1846.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (giving text of Article I).
91. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1846. The Arkansas Supreme Court was divid-
ed 5-2 over the constitutionality of the amendment. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 872
S.W.2d 349, 361 (Ark. 1994), ofd sub nom. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1842.
92. U.S. Term Limits, 872 S.W.2d at 356. The court based its decision on the "in-
conclusive" yet helpful historical evidence surrounding the clauses and on the United
States Supreme Court's reasoning in Powell. Id. at 355-56 (citing Powell v.
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not accept that the term limits were merely a ballot access provision
and thus within the power of Arkansas to enact under the Time, Place
and Manner Clause. 3 The court reasoned that "the intent and the ef-
fect" of the amendment was to completely disqualify an incumbent
from service, and that even though a candidate could run as a write-in,
the possibilities of winning were "glimmers of opportunity... so
faint... they cannot salvage Amendment 73 from constitutional at-
tack.' Two justices dissented, one finding that the clauses were not
exclusive (therefore Arkansas retained the authority to supplement
them) and the other reasoning that the term limit provision did not
even implicate the Clauses because it was a permissible ballot access
restriction and not a qualification." The State of Arkansas and the in-
tervenors both petitioned for writ of certiorari, which the United States
Supreme Court consolidated and granted.'
IV. SUMMARY OF THE OPINION
A. Justice Stevens and the Majority's Opinion
Justice Stevens began the majority opinion by defining the two issues
presented by U.S. Term Limits: whether the Constitution prohibits the
states from adding to the Qualifications Clauses, and if so, whether
Arkansas Amendment 73 was instead a permissible ballot restriction.
7
To help answer these questions, the majority revisited the Court's deci-
sion in Powell v. McCormack.' The majority found that Powell not on-
ly had decided whether Congress had the power to exclude a member,
but also answered an underlying issue-i.e., whether Congress lacked
the power to alter the Qualifications Clauses.' In reaching this conclu-
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 539 (1969)); see also supra notes 30-48 and accompanying
text (discussing Powell).
93. U.S. Term Limits, 872 S.W.2d at 356-57; see also supra note 55 (quoting text
of the Clause).
94. U.S. Term Limits, 872 S.W.2d at 357.
95. Id. at 367 (Hays, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 368
(Cracroft, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Two other justices wrote
concurring opinions. Id, at 361 (Brown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
id. at 363 (Dudley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
96. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1847.
97. Id.
98. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
99. US. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1847, 1851. The majority noted that state and
federal courts have also cited Powell for the principle that Congress has no power to
sion, the Court first examined the historical authority upon which
PoweU relied, which the U.S. Term Limits Court felt evidenced the
Framers' intent for the clauses to be exclusive."w The majority placed
special emphasis on Alexander Hamilton's words during the post-Con-
vention ratification debates: "The qualifications of the persons who may
choose or be chosen... are defined and fixed in the Constitution, and
are unalterable by the Legislature.""'1 Furthermore, the Court found
that allowing Congress to alter its own qualifications would undermine
the second basis for the decision in PoweU: the "'fundamental principle
of our representative democracy... 'that the people should choose
whom they please to govern them.'""
The majority acknowledged, however, that although the holding in
PoweU established that Congress did not have the power to alter the
Qualifications Clauses, PoweU did not specifically address the issue
before the Court in U.S. Term Limits: whether the states could alter
the Clauses."' The majority, therefore, went on to address the
petitioners' argument that the Tenth Amendment "require[s] that States
be allowed to add such qualifications."' ° The Court rejected this argu-
ment on two grounds: First, the power to alter the qualifications was
not an "original power" that the states could have reserved under the
Tenth Amendment; and second, even if it had been reserved, the Fram-
ers divested the states of this power by making the Qualifications
Clauses exclusive. 5
alter the qualifications for its membership. Id. at 1852-53.
100. Id. at 1845-50; see also supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text (discussing
PoweWs historical analysis).
101. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1849 (quoting Powell, 395 U.S. at 539 (quoting
THE FEDERALIST No. 60, at 371 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961))).
102. Id. at 1850 (quoting Powell, 395 U.S. at 547 (quoting Alexander Hamilton, in
DEBATES, supm note 48, at 257)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This principle
embodies two fundamental ideas regarding federal representation. First, the "door of
this part of the federal government is open to merit of every description, whether
native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to poverty or wealth,
or to any particular profession of religious faith." Id. (quoting Powel, 395 U.S. at 540
n.74 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 326 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961))). Second, people are "vested" with a sovereignty that gives them the right to
"choose freely their representatives to the National Government." Id. at 1851.
103. Id. at 1852. The petitioners argued that the holding in PoweU was limited to
which qualifications Congress could use in excluding a member. Id. at 1851. The
majority rejected this argument, stating, "[olur conclusion that Congress may not alter
or add to the qualifications ... was integral to our ... outcome." Id. The Court
also noted there was "striking unanimity" among the lower courts that Powell also
precluded states from adding qualifications. Id. at 1852.
104. Id. at 1852.
105. Id. at 1853-54.
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1. The Source of the Power. The Tenth Amendment
The majority addressed the meaning of the word "reserved" when
used in the Tenth Amendment to describe the powers of the states and
concluded these reserved powers are those "which existed before" the
Constitution."° In this instance, the power to add qualifications for
congressional membership could not have existed before the Constitu-
tion, because it was the document itself that established the United
States Congress-the Framers intended to "'create an entirely new Na-
tional Government,'" embodied in "a uniform national system, rejecting
the notion that the Nation was a collection of States and instead creat-
ing a direct link between the national government and the people of the
United States."' 7 Furthermore, if the states retained any power in re-
gard to the selection of federal representatives, there would be no rea-
son to delegate to them the duty to hold elections under the Times,
Places, and Manner Clause."°
Thus, because the Tenth Amendment allows states to exercise only
those powers that existed before the Constitution, and that are not
divested by the Constitution, the power to add qualifications was not
reserved to the states."
106. Id. at 1854. The evidence cited by the majority for this proposition included
Justice Story's opinion that "the states can exercise no powers whatsoever, which
exclusively spring out of the national government, which the constitution does not
delegate to them," id. (quoting 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONST'rUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES § 627 (3d ed., 1858)), and the opinion of the Court in
McCulloch v. Maryland, denying the states the right to tax federal banks, because
there was no -'original right' to tax such federal entities." Id. (quoting McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 430 (1819)).
107. Id, at 1855 (citing Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 10 (1964)). This conclusion
was based on Justice Story's argument that just like the President, members of Con-
gress owed their allegiance to the nation as a whole, not to the individual states, and
thus the states retain no more right to prescribe congressional qualifications than
presidential qualifications. Id. The majority also pointed to three textual provisions of
the Constitution-the power to set congressional salaries at the national (not state)
level, the power of the national legislature (not each state) to vote as a whole on
the qualifications of its members under Article I, § 5, Clause 1, and the power of the
federal government to alter the state's election laws under the Times, Places, and
Manner Clause-as evidence that the Framers intended a federal government with a
direct link to the people. Id.
108. Id, at 1855.
109. Id. at 1854.
2. The Preclusion of State Power. The Exclusivity of
The Qualifications Clauses
Not only did the majority preclude the Arkansas Amendment by find-
ing that the Tenth Amendment denies the states a reserved power to
impose term limits, but the majority also invalidated the imposition of
term limits on an alternative ground: the exclusivity of the Qualifica-
tions Clauses."0 The Court based this conclusion on events at the
Constitutional Convention and during the ratification debates, con-
gressional experience, democratic principles, and state practice."' In
examining historical evidence from the Convention and its surrounding
debates, the majority pointed to both the Framers' statements showing
they feared putting the national government at the mercy of the states
and the textual provisions the Framers inserted into the Constitution to
prevent this state control."2 The lack of discussion about the power
of states to add qualifications during both the Convention and subse-
quent debates, and the Convention's rejection of a rotation requirement,
further persuaded the majority that the Clauses precluded state alter-
ation."3 In looking at events in Congress itself, the majority pointed to
the McCreery incident"4 and to the Court's decision in Powel"5 as
confiration of their exclusivity argument."6 The majority also found
support in the democratic principles recognized in Powell."7 Not only
110. Id. at 1856.
111. Id. at 1856-66.
112. Id. at 1856-60. For example, during the Convention, James Madison, in refer-
ence to the power of the states to set the qualifications of voters in federal elec-
tions, but not those of candidates, noted: "'The qualifications of the elected, being
less carefully and properly defined by the State constitutions, and being at the same
time more susceptible to uniformity, have been very properly considered and regu-
lated by the convention.'" Id. at 1856 (quoting THE FEDERALISr No. 52, at 326 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). The Framers then gave Congress the ability to
alter state election laws under the Times, Places and Manner Clause, vested the pow-
er to set congressional salaries at the national level, and gave the authority to judge
the qualifications of members to each House as a whole (not to the individual state
from which the member was elected). Id. at 1857-59.
113. Id. at 1859. The majority believed the ability of the states to add qualifications
would have been used as an argument to appease anti-federalists who wanted more
power given to the states. Id. at 1860.
114. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text (discussing McCreery incident).
115. See supra notes 30-48 and accompanying text (discussing Powell case).
116. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1861. The majority also noted that even before
Powell, many viewed the seating of McCreery as establishing that the Qualifications
Clauses were exclusive. Id. at 1862. The majority also acknowledged, however, that
"the precedential value of congressional exclusion cases is 'quite limited.'" Id. (quot-
ing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 546 (1969)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
117. Id. at 1862.
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did the Arkansas term limits violate the twin ideals embodied in the
reasoning of PoweU, that "'the people should choose whom they please
to govern them,'" and that election to Congress should be "open to peo-
ple of all merit," but because imposed at the state level, the limits also
violated the principle that the right to elect representatives lies with the
people and not with the states.' In the opinion of the majority, the
Framers wanted a "Federal Government directly responsible to the peo-
ple.., chosen.., not by the States, but by the people."19 The indi-
vidual citizens of the nation would grant power to the federal govern-
ment which was to be exercised directly on them without interference
from the states.2 ° The majority ended their analysis of historical evi-
dence by examining the practice of the states following ratification. 2 '
Although discounting the reliability of state practice as an indicator of
constitutionality, the majority noted that after ratification, several states
amended their constitutions to remove property requirements for feder-
al candidates and that no state sought to impose term limits on their
federal representatives, presumably because the states understood that
they could not alter congressional qualifications."
"In sum, the available historical and textual evidence, read in light of
the basic principles of democracy... reveal[ed] ... neither Congress
nor the States should possess the power to supplement the exclusive
qualifications set forth in the text of the Constitution.""z3
3. The Times, Places and Manner Clause
Although the majority rejected the idea that Arkansas could alter the
Qualifications Clauses by imposing term limits, the petitioners also
contended the amendment was a permissible ballot access restriction
118. Id. (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969)).
119. Id. at 1863.
120. Id. Allowing each state to impose individual qualifications would undermine the
uniformity of the national body and "sever the direct link that the Framers found so
critical." Id. at 1864.
121. Id. at 1864.
122. Id. at 1864-66. This was particularly persuasive for the majority because prior
to ratification of the Constitution, the states operated under the Articles of Confeder-
ation which contained a provision limiting terms for national representatives. Id. at
1865. Because many members of the Convention unsuccessfully sought a similar rota-
tion requirement in the Constitution, they would have done so at the state level if
they thought it was within their power. Id. at 1865-66.
123. Id. at 1866.
under the Times, Places and Manner Clause"a because it was not an
absolute limit, but instead allowed for write-in incumbent candida-
cies."2 The Court, on the other hand, did not agree with this narrow
definition of the term "qualification." "2 They contrasted the quasi-term
limit imposed under Amendment 73 with the ballot restriction that the
Court upheld in Storer v. Broum. 27 Unlike in Storer, the Arkansas
term limit amendment indirectly attempted to do what the Constitution
forbids, adding a qualification, because the possibility of a candidate
winning a write-in campaign was "a faint glimmer." " Furthermore,
the Times, Places and Manner Clause allows states to regulate the pro-
cedure of elections, not the substantive qualifications of candidates."2
The restrictions in Storer "served the state interest in protecting the
integrity and regularity of the election process" and excluded candi-
dates on the basis of support in the electoral process, both factors of
which were independent from the constitutional prohibition on adding
qualifications."
Thus, although term limits "provide for the infusion of fresh ideas,"
and "decrease the likelihood that representatives will lose touch with
their constituents," Arkansas Amendment 73 could not stand because "a
state amendment is unconstitutional when it has the likely effect of
handicapping a class of candidates and has the sole purpose of creating
additional qualifications indirectly.""3 '
B. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
Justice Kennedy joined in the opinion of the Court, but filed a con-
curring opinion to reiterate that state-imposed term limits "run counter
to the fundamental principles of federalism.""3 Justice Kennedy ar-
gued that the legitimacy of the national government stems from the act
of the people, not of the states, in creating it. Thus, the people have
a national "political identity.., independent of... their identity as a
citizen of the State of their residence.""3 A state may not invade this
124. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; see supra note 55 (quoting text of clause).
125. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1866-71.
126. Id. at 1867.
127. Id.; see also supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text (discussing Storer).
128. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1868.
129. Id. at 1870.
130. Id. The majority also noted that if the term limit was allowed as a "manner"
of elections under the Clause, Congress had the ability to alter the limit, and, as the
Court decided in Powell, Congress may not alter its own qualifications. Id. at 1869.
131. Id. at 1871.
132. Id. at 1872 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
133. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
134. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy rejected the argument that be-
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realm of sovereign national identity, just as the federal government may
not "intrude[] upon [the] matters reserved to the States.""3 The sover-
eign sphere of national citizenship includes the right to vote for federal
representation, and the Arkansas amendment "intrudes upon this fed-
eral domain... exceed[ing] the boundaries of the Constitution.""z
C. Justice Thomas' Dissent
For Justice Thomas and his fellow dissenters, the issue presented by
US. Term Limits could be answered by looking at the text of the Con-
stitution which is "simply silent on this question. And where the Consti-
tution is silent, it raises no bar to action by the States or the peo-
ple."'
37
1. The Tenth Amendment
The dissent took issue with the majority's interpretation of the term
"reserved" as used in the Tenth Amendment to describe the powers of
the states." The dissent examined "first principles" of American gov-
ernment to refute the majority's conclusion that Arkansas did not have
the power to impose term limits, and found three faults with the
majority's reasoning."
First, "[t]he ultimate source of the Constitution's authority is the
consent of the people of each individual State, not the consent of the
undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole." "" The Tenth
cause the Constitution was ratified on a state-by-state basis, the people can only dele-
gate power through these states. Id. at 1873 (Kennedy, J., concurring). This ratifica-
tion procedure was just the most convenient. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 1873 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct.
1624 (1995)). Justice Kennedy also relied on the In re Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36 (1872), which expressed the idea that federal rights "stem from sources
other than the States." U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1874 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring).
136. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct at 1875 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
137. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and
Scalia joined in the dissenting opinion. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissenters
reasoned that if the Constitution does not deny a power to the states to act, and it
does not exclusively give the power to the federal government, then the states need
not point to any affirmative grant in order to act. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
138. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
139. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
140. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). This source of the Constitution's authority was evi-
Amendment's phrase "powers... reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people," makes no differentiation between the states and the
people, and thus it is left to the people of each state, not the citizens of
the nation as a whole, to determine the powers that the people retain
and those which can be exercised by their state government.141 There-
fore, the sovereignty embodied in the Constitution follows state bound-
aries, and does not, as the majority argued, erase them."4 Further-
more, the dissenters disagreed with the majority's view that a state can
exercise a Tenth Amendment "reserved power" only if the state held
the power before ratification of the Constitution." The dissent re-
turned to the authority relied upon by the majority in support of its
position, and noted this authority dealt with "an entirely different issue:
the extent to which principles of state sovereignty implicit in our feder-
al system curtail Congress' authority to exercise its enumerated pow-
ers."
14
denced by the state-by-state ratification procedure, the words of the Constitution itself
("We the People of the United States"), and the fact that the individual states them-
selves gave up certain powers to the federal government in ratifying the Constitution.
Id. at 1875-76 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
141. Id. at 1876 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissenters noted that the Constitution
provides no "mechanism" for the exercise of such a unified voice, for amendments
are to be ratified state-by-state, the President is elected from an electoral college cho-
sen at the state level, and if no Presidential candidate receives a majority of electoral
college votes, each state is given one vote in determining the winner when the elec-
tion is thrown to the House of Representatives. Id. at 1876-77 (Thomas, J., dis-
senting).
142. Id. at 1877 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 1878 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas called such a limitation on
state power "enormous and untenable." Id. at 1877 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also
supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text (summarizing majority's Tenth Amendment
argument).
144. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct at 1878 (Thomas, J., dissenting). According to the
dissent, the issue in US. Term Limits was not whether the Tenth Amendment barred
congressional action, but whether Article I barred state action. Id, at 1878-79 (Thom-
as, J., dissenting) (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985) and New York v. United States, 112 S. CL 2408 (1992)). The dissent also ex-
amined the majority's reliance on McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819), and concluded that the McCulloch Court based its decision on the Supremacy
Clause, and not the proposition that a state could not possess a power it did not
have prior to the ratification of the Constitution. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at
1879-80 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent discounted the majority's only other line
of authority, Justice Story, because he was not a Founding Father, and his interpre-
tation was written half a century after the Constitution's ratification. Id at 1880.
(Thomas, J., dissenting). The majority rebutted this argument by pointing out that
because it felt McCulloch relied on the idea of original powers as being those of the
states before the Constitution, the McCuWoch decision gave credibility to Justice
Story's interpretation of reserved powers. Id. at 1854.
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The second concept disputed by the dissent was the majority's un-
derstanding that it would "be inconsistent with the notion of 'national
sovereignty' for the States... to have any reserved powers over the
selection of Member of Congress."46 The dissenters did not accept the
insistence of the majority and concurrence that members of Congress
owe their primary allegiance to the people of the nation as a whole, and
pointed to the text of the Constitution, which provides that members
are to be "chosen 'by the People of the several States,'" as support."4
The dissent agreed that the Framers wanted "to create a 'direct link'
between" the people and the federal government, but noted "the link
was between the Representatives from each State and the people of
that State."
147
Third, the dissenters questioned the majority's contention that if the
states retained power under the Tenth Amendment over the selection of
their representatives, then the Times, Places, and Manner Clause was
irrelevant.' The dissenters responded that the Clause was not mean-
ingless because it imposed a duty to hold elections, instead of relying
solely on a state's reserved power to do so.' Thus, the Clause provid-
145. Id. at 1881. (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also supra note 106 and accompany-
ing text (summarizing majority's sovereignty argument).
146. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1881 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1) (emphasis added). The dissent further disagreed with the
concurring opinion's reliance on the conclusion that when voters exercise their right
to vote for federal representation, they are acting as citizens of the United States and
not of the state where they reside. Id. at 1881-82 (Thomas, J., dissenting). As previ-
ously pointed out by the dissent, the Constitution called for a state-centered congres-
sional election procedure and did not provide a mechanism for the exercise of
electoral action by an undifferentiated people. Id. at 1882 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see
also supm note 141.
147. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1882 (Thomas, J., dissenting). For the dissent-
ers, this meant that the people of one state have no say over whom the people of
another state send to Congress. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). As for the evidence re-
lied upon by the majority, the fact that congressional salaries were set at the nation-
al level only shows that a state's powers may not extend beyond the selection of its
representatives. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). In addition, although, as the majority
stated, individual states cannot impose qualifications on the President, the dissent
argued this only added to its understanding that a state may not influence the offi-
cers elected from another state, for the President is an officer of all the states. Id.
(Thomas, J., dissenting); see also supra note 106 (examining the evidence cited by
the majority in reaching its conclusion).
148. Id. at 1883 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also supra note 107 and accompanying
text (discussing the majority's interpretation of the Times, Places and Manner Clause).
149. US. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1883 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
ed insurance for the Framers who feared that the states would neglect
to hold elections, leaving the federal government at the mercy of these
states. "
2. The Qualifications Clauses
After having established that "the people of Arkansas do enjoy 're-
served' powers over the selection of their representatives in Congress,"
the dissenters then turned to refuting the majority's alternative basis for
invalidating the term limit amendment: the Qualifications Clauses are
exclusive and therefore create an independent constitutional ban on a
state's power to supplement them. 5 '
a. Minimum Requirements
Instead of establishing exclusive qualifications for members of Con-
gress, the dissent argued that the Qualifications Clauses established
only "minimum eligibility requirements that the Framers thought it es-
sential for every Member of Congress to meet."" z Although the Fram-
ers included some qualifications and not others, this does not mean that
the Constitution bars the states from adopting additional qualifications
later, at the very most, this listing implies only that there could be no
additional nationwide qualifications."u The dissenters reasoned that
the Qualifications Clauses were intended to ensure states would not
send "immature, disloyal, or unknowledgable representatives to Con-
gress," thereby jeopardizing the interests of other states."M When vot-
150. Id (Thomas, J., dissenting). Likewise, the dissent noted that Article I, § 2,
Clause 1 of the Constitution states that the qualifications of electors for members of
the House of Representatives will be the same as those for the most numerous
branch of that state's legislature, and the Court has interpreted this clause to mean
that although qualifications for congressional electors cannot be more stringent than a
state standard, they may be less so. Id. at 1884 (Thomas, J., dissenting). If this is
true, then a state has some powers over congressional selection which were not ex-
pressly granted; therefore, they must have been "reserved" under the Tenth Amend-
ment, despite not existing before the Constitution itself. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
151. Id, at 1884-85 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
152. Id, at 1885 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 1886 (Thomas, J., dissenting). This rejected theory rested on "the maxim
expressio unius est exclusio aterius" ("the inclusion of one thing is the exclusion of
another") and had been applied to the phrasing of the Qualifications Clauses by Jo-
seph Story. Id. at 1886 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 1850 n.9 (citing 2 JOSEPH STO-
RY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 624 (1833)). The
dissent noted that the Constitution does make express prohibitions on state power in
Article I, § 10, thus using the expressio unius maxim makes little sense with respect
to state power. Id. at 1887 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 1886 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The majority answered the dissent by
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ers of an individual state enact additional qualifications for their repre-
sentatives, they have done nothing to frustrate this purpose.'" The
dissenters explained that the Framers could not have intended what the
majority referred to as a "uniform... national character" of qualifica-
tions, because not only did the Framers provide for a state-centered
system of elections, but at the time of ratification, the national citizen-
ship requirement was a function of state law.M
b. Democratic Principles
The dissenters also disagreed with the majority's finding that the
Arkansas amendment violated democratic principles of the Framers.57
The dissent reasoned that the democratic intent of the Framers underly-
ing the Qualifications Clauses was to prevent Congress, not the states,
from imposing its own qualifications." Thus, the issue in Powell was
not whether the Clauses are exclusive, but whether the Constitution
granted the House the power to judge its members on the basis of qual-
ifications beyond those enumerated in the Constitution." Allowing
federal representatives to set their own qualifications would let them
asking "why the people of the Nation lack a comparable interest in allowing every
State to send mature, loyal, and knowledgeable representatives to Congress." Id. at
1864 n.32 (emphasis added).
155. Id. at 1886 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 1887-88 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The citizenship laws of each state relied
on different criteria, and thus, even at the time enacted, the three qualifications set
out in the Qualifications Clauses varied from state to state. Id. at 1888 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). The dissenters also noted that Thomas Jefferson believed that the Consti-
tution did not "prohibit to the State the power of declaring... disqualifications
which its particular circumstances may call for .... Of course, then, by the tenth
amendment, the power is reserved to the State.'" Id. at 1888-89 (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Thomas Jefferson, LETrER TO JOSEPH CABELL (Jan. 31, 1814), in 14
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 82-83 (A. Lipscomb ed., 1904)). The majority respond-
ed by offering Jefferson's owns words that a state's power to alter qualifications of
its members in Congress was "'one of the doubtful questions on which honest men
may differ.'" Id. at 1860 n.24 (quoting Jefferson, supra at 83).
157. Id. at 1889 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
158. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
159. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). "The reason for Congress' incapacity is not that
the Qualifications Clauses deprive Congress of the authority to set qualifications, but
rather that nothing in the Constitution grants Congress this power." Id. (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Although the federal government is one of enumerated powers that must
look for an afflrmative grant of power in order to act, the states are not bound in
such a manner and therefore need not find this affirmative grant of power to act. Id.
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
"perpetuate themselves" in office and would allow states to collaborate
within Congress to pass federal legislation preventing another state
from electing their "preferred candidate," two problems not present
when qualifications are set at the state level."
The dissenters agreed with the majority, that PoweU relied on Alexan-
der Hamilton's belief that the "people should choose whom they please
to govern them," but in their opinion, the voters of Arkansas had cho-
sen to exclude incumbents from their field of candidates.1 6 1 The dis-
senters also agreed that Powell embodied the egalitarian principle that
"the opportunity to be elected [is] open to all," but noted that congres-
sional candidacy is not a personal right, especially if voters have decid-
ed not to elect that candidate. '6
Finally, until the passing of the Seventeenth Amendment which calls
for direct elections, United States Senators were elected from state
legislatures free to use any qualifications prescribed by that state
body. The fact that the people of Arkansas-not the state legisla-
ture-enacted the term limits furthered the dissent's argument that the
Arkansas amendment did not violate any democratic principles.'
160. Id. at 1890 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 1891 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Hamilton, in DEBATES, supra note
48, at 257).
162. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). If this were true, a candidate who lost the primary
could have the right to appear on the ballot in the general election. Id. (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). The statements of James Madison that the "'door... [to congressional
election] . . . is open to merit of every description,'" merely reflected that the Consti-
tution itself did not place undue burdens on candidacy. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(quoting THE FEDERAuST No. 52, at 326 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
The majority countered this by calling the dissent's interpretation "implausible," when
viewed in the context of Madison's entire statement, which related to the reasonable-
ness of limitations on candidates for federal office in relation to those that the states
impose on electors. Id. at 1857 n.18; see supra note 102 and accompanying text (ex-
plaining the majority's position).
163. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1892 (Thomas, J., dissenting). "If there is no
reason to believe that the ... Constitution barred state legislatures from adopting
prospective rules to narrow their choices for Senator, then there is also no reason to
believe that it barred the people of the States .... . Id. at 1893 (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing).
164. Id. at 1893 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissenters also noted that it was in-
appropriate to use democratic principles to preclude the Arkansas amendment when
it remained entirely within the control of the Arkansas voters to repeal the amend-
ment, just as they had enacted it. Id. at 1890 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The majority
stated, however, that it could point to "no case that would even suggest that the
validity of a state law under the Federal Constitution would depend at all on
whether the state law was passed by the state legislature or by the people directly."
Id. at 1858 n.19.
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c. History
Despite the majority's assertions to the contrary, the dissenters
maintained that not only were state-imposed qualifications consistent
with democratic principles, but also that these qualifications were sup-
ported by historical evidence."6
Just as they reasoned in their interpretation of the Tenth Amendment,
the dissenters again asserted that the Court's decision in PoweU v.
McCormack did not relate to the question now facing the Court." In-
stead, PoweU established that Congress could not alter its own qualifi-
cations, "highlight[ing] the weakness of the majority's evidence that the
States and the people of the States also lack this power.""7 Congress
did not have the power to impose additional qualifications because that
power was left up to the states."
The dissent also disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the
ratification debates and the Framers' rationale underlying specific provi-
sions of the Constitution.'" Although the majority placed little weight
on the views of the Committee of Detail charged with drafting the Con-
stitution, the dissent found the Committee's specific deletion of an
exclusivity provision from the Qualifications Clause for the lower House
of Congress persuasive evidence that the Clauses were not intended to
be exclusive. 7 ' Furthermore, none of the constitutional "provisions
cited by the majority is inconsistent with state power to add qualifica-
tions for congressional office," because even if the majority's interpreta-
tion "were correct, the most that one could infer is that the Framers
165. Id. at 1894 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
166. Id. Crhomas, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 1894-95 (Thomas, J., dissenting). For example, Powel relied heavily on
Alexander Hamilton's statement that congressional qualifications "'are defined and
fixed in the Constitution, and are unalterable by the legislature.'" Id. at 1895 n.18
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 60, at 371 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). In the dissenters' opinion, Hamilton only referred to
qualifications being fixed in relation to the lack of the national legislature's power to
alter them. Id, (Thomas, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 1895 n.18 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The majority argued that Power never
mentioned this "default rule," and furthermore, the Court has never treated the con-
cept of a default rule as absolute. Id. at 1851 n.12.
169. Id. at 1895-96 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 1895 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Yet the majority found this point to be
"irrelevant" because the Framers, wanting to further reduce the "barriers that would
exclude the most able citizens from service in the National government," excluded
the provision. Id. at 1860 n.27.
did not want state legislatures to be able to prescribe qualifica-
tions."1
7 1
d. The Ratification Period
The dissenters found unconvincing the majority's reliance on the lack
of an affirmative statement in the ratification debate records that the
states were free to add qualifications."7 The records showed neither
171. Id. at 1896 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The provision setting
federal representatives' salaries at the national level evidenced the Framers' intent to
prevent a state's improper influence on its representatives after the election, such as
withholding their salary in order to force them to vote in a particular manner. Id,
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Furthermore, not permitting states, under the Electors
Clause, to raise voter requirements in House of Representative elections above those
needed to vote in elections for members of the state's highest legislature, was merely
a "natural concomitant of one of the Framers' most famous decisions" to allow elec-
tors of each state, and not the state legislature, to vote for Representatives. Id. at
1896-97 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Although under Article I, § 5, each House is to be
the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its members, that does not
mean, as the majority contended, that Congress could not use state laws as the stan-
dard for deciding eligibility. Id. at 1897 (Thomas, J., dissenting). After all, state law
determined which ballots were considered "valid," and furthermore, the term "qualifi-
cations" may only refer to the ability to judge the three qualifications set forth in the
Qualifications Clauses, and not those imposed by states. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Finally, although the majority argued that because the Times, Places and Manner
Clause empowered Congress to make or alter state election procedures, the Framers
could not have intended to allow states to add substantive qualifications that would
not be subject to this congressional override, the dissenters instead viewed the
override as allowed only in instances where the Framers "trusted" Congress more
than the states. Id. at 1898 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Although the Framers trusted
Congress to provide for procedural laws ensuring their own existence through elec-
tions, they did not trust Congress to set its own qualifications, and thus they would
not have given it override powers in this area. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). If a state
ever set its qualifications for membership so high that no candidate could meet such
requirements (in effect failing to hold an election), not only did the Constitution pro-
vide remedial procedures when congressional vacancies occur, but furthermore a state
could not impose unconstitutional qualifications. Id. at 1899-900 (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing). Just as these provisions showed that the Framers did not fear that a state
could effectively destroy congressional elections, the Framers were even less likely to
fear that the people of a state would act to totally disenfranchise themselves. See id.
at 1900 n.22 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The majority called this distinction between the
actions of the people of a state and those of the state's legislature "untenable." Id. at
1858 n.19; see also supra note 164 (discussing the reasoning behind the majority's
conclusion). Furthermore, the majority argued that the dissent's reading of these pro-
visions revealed, and actually understated, the Framers' distrust of the states with
regard to elections, and thus further supported the majority's argument that the
Framers intended the qualifications to be exclusive. U.S. Ter Limits, 115 S. Ct. at
1859 n.21.
172. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1900 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also supra
note 113 and accompanying text (explaining the majority's argument).
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an affirmative statement permitting the states to supplement the qualifi-
cations, nor statements prohibiting the states from altering the enumer-
ated qualifications.' Furthermore, at the time of the ratification, sev-
eral states imposed religious qualifications on their state legislators, and
thus in order to prevent the states from imposing similar religious, but
not other, qualifications on their federal representatives, the Framers
included in Article VI the statement that "no religious Test shall ever be
required as a Qualification to any Office or pubic trust under the United
States."74
e. State Practice
The dissenters then turned their attention to state practice following
ratification. They found persuasive several pieces of evidence showing
that the states did not believe the Clauses were exclusive: the addition
by Virginia of a property requirement for its Congress members, the
adoption by seven states of district elections, and the imposition by five
states of district residency requirements (three of which were duration-
al). 76 As to the majority's argument that if the Constitution had truly
empowered states to enact further qualifications, then the states would
have imposed rotation requirements, the dissent argued that the circum-
173. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1901 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissenters
argued the inverse of the majority's reasoning: if the Constitution was "understood to
deprive the States of this significant power, one might well have expected its oppo-
nent to seize on this point in arguing against ratification." Id. (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing). In this discussion of the ratification period, the dissenters also pointed to the
words of James Madison relied on by the majority. Id. at 1901-02 (Thomas, J., dis-
senting); see supra note 112 (quoting Madison's words).
174. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1902-03 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S.
CONST. art VI). This provision cut against the majority's expressio unius maxim argu-
ment, because if the Constitution expressly prohibited religious qualifications, it must
not prohibit other qualifications. Id. at 1903 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also supra
note 153 (explaining the majority's expressio unius maxim argument).
175. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1903-04 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Furthermore,
the state legislative debates surrounding the enactment of these requirements indicat-
ed that the states questioned their ability to add qualifications and, deciding in the
affirmative, passed the provisions. Id. at 1904-05 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The majori-
ty found these provisions unconvincing, asserting that more states would have adopt-
ed property qualifications if they thought it was permitted under the Constitution. Id.
at 1866 n.41; see also infra note 177 and accompanying text In addition, the majority
argued that the states imposing district requirements felt these requirements were
merely an "analog" to the residency requirement contained in the Clauses. US. Term
Limits, 115 S. Ct at 1866 n.41.
stances at the time of the Constitution's framing did not give rise to a
need for term limits, because the advantages of incumbency were min-
imal, and a term limit would prevent keeping good legislators in of-
fice.'76 Moreover, several other factors may have contributed to more
states' failure to impose property requirements, including that states
deemed it unnecessary given the minimal likelihood that a "pauper"
could be elected to the House, or that because the states lacked a gen-
eral understanding of their ability to impose such requirements, they
wanted to "stay away from difficult constitutional questions" that may
have temporarily deprived them of representation in Congress.'77
f. Congressional Experience
The dissent concluded its analysis of historical evidence by emphasiz-
ing that congressional actions were too erratic to be of much
precedential value, and that those cited by the majority were "mislead-
ing."7 8 In particular, the dissent presented evidence showing the inac-
curacy of the McCreery incident as reported in Powell v. McCormack,
upon which the majority heavily relied.7
Consequently, because the dissent found unpersuasive the historical
evidence that the Framers intended the Clauses to be exclusive, and
176. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1906 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent sup-
ported this argument by noting that although states could impose their own term
limits under the Articles of Confederation, only four states adopted limits, and only
Pennsylvania's limit differed from the one actually contained in the Articles. Id.
(Thomas, J., dissenting). The majority countered that several states rejected a rotation
requirement amendment to the Constitution at their own ratification conventions. Id.
at 1859-60. Yet, as the dissenters pointed out, save for one of these, all involved only
term limits on the office of President Id. at 1906 (Thomas, J., dissenting). This, in
turn, supported the dissent's position that states thought it unnecessary to propose an
amendment for term limits on members of Congress, because they believed that they
retained the power to add qualifications for their Congress members, but not for the
President. Id. at 1907 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 1907-08 n.37 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The majority noted that this actu-
ally undercut the dissent's argument, because if the states questioned their ability to
impose additional qualifications, it is even less likely that the Framers did not intend
for the Clauses to be exclusive. Id. at 1866 n.41.
178. Id. at 1908 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
179. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Powell Court failed to recognize that Congress
rejected passing the resolutions which stated that McCreery was eligible to be seated
because he was qualified under the Constitution, despite the additional qualifications
that Maryland sought to impose. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 24-
29 and accompanying text (discussing the McCreery incident).
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because the express text of the Constitution did not prohibit states
from imposing additional qualifications, the people of Arkansas held the
power to impose term limits."s
3. Amendment 73 was not a "Qualification"
The dissenters also disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the
quasi-term limits imposed by the Arkansas voters were the equivalent of
absolute term limits that created additional qualifications."8 ' An incum-
bent could still be elected as a write-in candidate, and the possibilities
of this were much greater than the majority believed."u Furthermore,
the Arkansas voters did not necessarily intend to impose term limits as
an additional qualification, but rather intended to "level the playing
field" between incumbents and candidates running without the benefits
available to sitting Congress members."8 The dissent found the
majority's definition of a qualification as a "handicap" on a class of
candidates too broad and additionally argued that the definition called
into question previous Court decisions involving such candidate handi-
caps evaluated under the First and Fourteenth Amendments rather than
under the Qualifications Clauses."s The dissenters would not have
180. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1909 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
181. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). The majority felt this finding was irrelevant to its
holding, because the amendment nonetheless had the "likely effect of handicapping a
class of candidates and ha[d] the sole purpose of creating additional qualifications
indirectly." Id. at 1871.
182. Id. at 1909-10 (Thomas, J., dissenting). For example, in 1992, Independent Ross
Perot won the Democratic presidential primary in North Dakota precisely because he
was well known and well funded, characteristics similar to those of an incumbent.
Id at 1910 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent also stated that the majority relied
too heavily on the plurality opinion of the Arkansas Supreme Court in concluding
that the quasi-term limits were equivalent to absolute limits. Id (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing). The majority disagreed, noting that a majority of the Arkansas justices, although
not all joining in the plurality opinion, found that the limit made re-election for in-
cumbents a virtual impossibility. Id. at 1868 n.44.
183. Id. at 1911 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent listed the numerous advantag-
es an incumbent wields by virtue of holding federal office. Id. (Thomas, J., dis-
senting); see supra note 5 (listing these advantages). Contrary to the majority's con-
clusion, the dissent argued that not only do the words "term limits" contained in the
amendment's preamble refer only to the absolute limits on state officials also con-
tained in the amendment, but that the intent of thousands of individuals in voting for
the amendment was extremely difficult to ascertain. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at
1911 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The majority called the dissents suggestion that the
voters intended a leveling effect "unpersuasive." Id, at 1871.
184. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct at 1912-13 (Thomas, J., dissenting). For example,
drawn such a broad implication from the Qualifications Clauses, but
instead would have "read the... Clauses to do no more than what they
say. "8
V. ANALYSIS
A. The Tenth Amendment
Although the Court's interpretation of the Tenth Amendment has
never been clear," in a recent expression of its interpretation the
Court stated that generally applicable federal regulation of the states
would not constitute an invasion of the states' reserved powers under
the Tenth Amendment because states must rely on the federal political
system in order to preserve their interests. 7 In this earlier decision,
the Court explicitly relied on the states' involvement in federal elections
as justification for its holding."* Yet, in U.S. Term Limits, the Court
ignored this rationale thereby modifying its earlier holding; its decision
now leaves the states without power over whom is sent into the federal
political system to protect their interests.'8w
the majority's expansive holding presumably also invalidated state statutes disqualify-
ing candidates who are mentally incompetent, imprisoned, or ineligible to vote. Id. at
1909 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent further noted that not only cases involving
ballot access, but also campaign financing and redistricting, may now also be subject
to this handicap standard. Id. at 1913 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 1914 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
186. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2420 (1992) ("The Court's
jurisprudence in this area has traveled an unsteady path."); Joshua Levy, Can They
Throw the Bums Out? The Constitutionality of State-Imposed Congressional Term
Limits, 80 GEO. LJ. 1913, 1934 (1992) ("The precise scope and application of the
Tenth Amendment remains an unsettled area of constitutional law.").
187. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 533 (1985). But see
New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2435 (1992) (holding federal regulation
not valid if the regulation is not generally applicable and requires states to adopt
legislation).
188. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-52. The Garcia Court reasoned that the Framers delib-
erately involved the states in federal elections, e.g., in setting the qualifications of
electors and in electing Senators from the state legislatures, in order to ensure the
states a role in the federal government, for "the principal means chosen by the Fram-
ers to ensure the role of the States in the federal system lies in the structure of the
Federal Government itself." Id. at 550-51. The Garcia Court further maintained that
the states' interests were better protected by these "procedural safeguards . . . than
by judicially created limitations on federal power." Id. at 552.
189. See U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1854 (holding that a state may exercise no
power that it did not possess before creation of the Constitution and, because Con-
gress did not exist before the Constitution, the state has no power over the qualifica-
tions of its members); see also Hills, supra note 24, at 135-37 (arguing that in light
of Garcia, the Court should not limit a state's right to prescribe qualifications for its
federal representatives in Congress). As Hills noted, 'the state's political machinery
[Vol. 24: 649, 1997] U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Furthermore, the Court has stated that the Tenth Amendment grants
the states the right to "determine the qualifications of their most impor-
tant government officials," and this right lies at the "heart of a represen-
tative government. " " Although the Court stated this in relation to a
state setting qualifications for its own officials, if the right is central to
a "representative government," it is unclear why the Court did not apply
the same rationale at the federal level. 9
As noted in the History section of this Note, the Court has never used
the Tenth Amendment as a limitation on a state's powers."9 Although
the federal government's authority stems from the powers enumerated
in the Constitution, under the Tenth Amendment a state looks to its
own state constitution to determine its powers." The determination
is not absolute, however, for the "Tenth Amendment reserves to the
states powers not prohibited by the Constitution. Whether or not states
have the power under the Tenth Amendment to impose term limitations
depends on the interpretation of the Qualifications Clause[s]."' The
Court, on the other hand, made an affirmative statement about the pow-
ers a state may exercise under the Tenth Amendment,9 ' when it could
(including state constitutional provisions that limit federal terms) provide[s] a means
by which the less wealthy or well-organized groups can participate in government."
Id. at 136 n.164 (citing Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Juris-
prudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 341, 392).
190. Gregory v. Ashcroit 501 U.S. 452, 463 (1991) (holding that a state has power
to set qualifications for state officers). The Gregory Court noted that the federalist
structure of the United States government ensures "a decentralized government that is
more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society" and a government
.more responsive" to these needs. Id. at 468. Ironically, this is exactly what the Ar-
kansas voters were trying to accomplish under the Tenth Amendment with term lim-
its. See infra notes 218-23 and accompanying text (discussing the intent of the Arkan-
sas voters).
191. See U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1891 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
192. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (discussing the history surround-
ing the Tenth Amendment). But see US. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct at 1854 (contending
that the Court decided McCulloch v. Maryland, U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), on the
rationale that the power to tax a federal bank was not an original power existing
before the Constitution, and thus could not be exercised by the states).
193. See Rotunda, supra note 2, at 576-77 n56. The Arkansas measure was an
amendment to the state constitution.
194. Julia C. Wommack, Congressional Reform: Can Term Limitations Close the
Door on Political Careerism?, 24 ST. MARY'S LJ. 1361, 1372 (1993) (arguing that, al-
though constitutional, the goals of term limits could best be met by another method).
195. See U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct at 1854 (ruling that a power must have exist-
ed before the Constitution to be exercised by a state under the Tenth Amendment).
have limited its holding by ruling that the Constitution denies the power
of the states to enact term limits because the Qualifications Clauses are
exclusive. Not only did the Arkansas Supreme Court limit its decision
to holding that the Qualifications Clauses are exclusive, thus precluding
the term limits,"9 but the traditional rule is that the Court should not
"formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the
precise facts to which it is to be applied."197
B. The Qualiications Clauses
Even assuming that the majority's rationale provides support for its
holding that the Framers intended the Qualifications Clauses to be ex-
clusive," the rationale does not conflict with the term limit amend-
ment passed in Arkansas. The majority stated that the Framers wanted
to ensure every person would have a chance to be elected, and thus,
the Framers left "'the door to this part of the federal government...
open to merit of every description, whether native or adoptive, whether
young or old, and without regard to poverty or wealth, or to any par-
ticular profession of religious faith. '""9 Unfortunately, seated House
and Senate members, through the power of incumbency, have closed
this door, especially with respect to the clause "without regard to pov-
erty or wealth."2' Furthermore, although the majority relied heavily
on the Framers' rejection of a term limit or rotation amendment for the
Constitution,"'. during the 18th and 19th centuries, term limits were
not needed to ensure that the "door" to election would remain open be-
cause voluntary rotation was the tradition.2 In addition, term limits
196. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 872 S.W.2d 349, 357 (Ark. 1994), affd sub nom.
U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1842.
197. Liverpool S.S. Co. v. Emigration Conun'rs, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885); see also Jean
v. Nelson 472 U.S. 846, 854 (1985) (reiterating that the Court should not decide con-
stitutional issues "unnecessarily"). But see John P. Frantz, Note, Federal Preclusion of
State-Imposed Congressional Term Limits: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,, 19
HARv. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 174, 186-87 (arguing that the U.S. Term Limits Court should
have limited its holding to the Tenth Amendment issue thereby avoiding the Qualifi-
cations Clauses issue).
198. "[Tlhe fact of the matter is that the historical understanding of the Qualifica-
tions Clauses of Article I is far from clear." Rotunda, supra note 2, at 574. "The
orginalist position regarding the exclusivity of the Qualifications clauses is, therefore,
one of doubt." Hills, supra note 24, at 132.
199. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1857 (quoting THE FEDERAUST No. 52, at 326
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
200. See supra note 5 (listing examples of incumbents' "base wealth").
201. See US. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1867-68.
202. During the Civil War era, for example, less than 2% of the members of the
House served more than 12 years. Brief for the State Petitioner at 19, U.S. Term
Limits (Nos. 93-1456, 93-1828). In addition, the Framers specifically limited House
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have actually been shown to infuse more ethnic minorities and women
into office.2'
The Court's stated philosophy on elections is that elections should
not "freeze[] the status quo ... but recognize[] the potential fluidity of
American political life."2" Yet the political status quo freezes when the
door to federal office is closed by the incumbent "ins" able to exclude
the political "outs." 2° For example, in 1973 the Court upheld the
Hatch Act, a law prohibiting federal employees from running for office
or taking an active role in campaigns, in order to prevent these incum-
bent parties from entrenching themselves and excluding others.'
The majority also argued that the Framers intended the Qualifications
Clauses to be exclusive to ensure that Congress remains a uniform
body; otherwise, the "diverse interests of the States would undermine
the National Legislature," and leave the federal government at the mer-
cy of the states."' As an example of the Framers' intent to remove
state influence over the federal government, the majority noted that
individual states may not set congressional salaries, and thus are pre-
terms to two years in order "to allow them ample time to master the duties of their
offices.., yet prevent them from losing an intimate sympathy with the people." Id.
(quoting TiE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 327 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
For a complete discussion of the lack of need for term limits at the time of ratifica-
tion, see JAMES K COYNE & JON H. FUND, CLEANING HOUSE 88, 112-13 (1992) and
Killenbeck & Sheppard, supra note 8, at 1137-43.
203. See Rotunda, supra note 2, at 567 n.20; Madeleine Kunin, Give Everyone a
Turn at the Game Term Limits, LA. TIMEs, Sept. 13, 1991, at B7 (arguing that term
limits open the political process to more minorities).
204. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 439 (1971).
205. Hills, supra note 24, at 138.
206. See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-
CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 565-66 (1973) (holding that the party in power should be prevent-
ed "from using the thousands . . . of federal employees, paid for at public expense,
to man its political structure and political campaigns"); see also Hills, supra note 24,
at 146-47 (arguing that term limits are consistent with the United States Civil Service
Commission rationale).
207. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1857. The majority did not acknowledge that
although the body itself may be uniform, states may set their own qualifications for
those eligible to vote for members of this body, thereby creating a "patchwork of
state qualifications" for voters, if not for the federal representatives they elect. See
id, at 1864; see also Frantz, supra note 197, at 186 (arguing that Alexander Hamilton
himself did not "disput[e] state power to set qualifications for those 'who may be
elected'" when he spoke of state power to set qualifications for voters); Rotunda,
supra note 2, at 579 n.64 (discussing the ability of the states to set voter qualifica-
tions).
vented from lowering salaries to a level that would "'keep out of offices
the men most capable of executing the functions of them.'"' None-
theless, as noted previously, the Court indicated in an earlier decision
that a state's only protection of its sovereign interests is the federal
political process.2' By allowing members of Congress to use federal
resources to keep themselves in office, and thus possibly keeping out
the most capable women and men from these offices, the Court left the
states at the mercy of the federal government.
Both the majority and dissent acknowledged that the Framers feared
that the states would fail to hold congressional elections, and therefore
create another route by which to leave the federal government at the
states' mercy."' The majority, however, wrongly believed that unless
the Qualifications Clauses were exclusive, the states could achieve the
same result by holding elections, but setting qualifications so high no
one could meet the qualifications.' Yet, a term limit is not a
qualification in this sense, because a state can neither disqualify all
viable 'candidates through limiting terms,212 nor impose an unconstitu-
tional qualification.213
Finally, the Court stated that the most important reason for its hold-
ing the Clauses exclusive was that allowing states to impose term limits
under the Qualifications Clauses would undermine the democratic ideal,
"'the people should choose whom they please to govern them,'" that the
Framers sought to protect.14 If term limits violate a fundamental dem-
ocratic principle, then the Court cannot justify term limits a state im-
poses on its own officials, despite the fact that such limits have sur-
vived constitutional attack.215 Moreover, the Arkansas voters them-
selves enacted Amendment 73, and although the U.S. Term Limits
majority discounted this as affecting the constitutionality of the amend-
ment, in a previous decision the Court upheld a Missouri voter-enacted
208. US. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1858 (quoting Nathaniel Gorham, in 1
FARRAND, supra note 44, at 216).
209. See supra notes 187-88 (discussing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528, 533 (1985)).
210. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1858, 1883 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 1858.
212. See Vance, supra note 7, at 445.
213. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1900 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 1862 (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969) (quoting
James Madison, in DEBATES, supra note 48, at 257)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
215. See Brief for the State Petitioner at 24, US. Term Limits (Nos. 93-1456, 93-
1828); see also supra note 78 and infTa note 220 and accompanying text (discussing
judicial treatment of state term limits). Only 12 states do not impose term limits of
some sort on their own officials. Brief for the State Petitioner at 24, US. Term Lim-
its (Nos. 93-1456, 93-1828).
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requirement, stating, "[iln this case, we are dealing not merely with
governmental action, but with a state constitutional provision approved
by the people of Missouri as a whole. This constitutional provision re-
flects the... citizens of Missouri who voted for it."21 Additionally, it
can be argued that the Arkansas term limit amendment, enacted by a
ballot initiative, was merely a democratic election before the election,
with the voters electing not to choose an incumbent.217
C. The Times, Places and Manner Clause
The U.S. Term Limits Court also reasoned that the Arkansas amend-
ment could not be considered an allowable regulation of elections un-
der the Times, Places, and Manner Clause, because it could not be "se-
riously contended" that the intent of the Amendment was anything
other than "dress[ing] eligibility to stand for Congress in ballot access
clothing."" ' The majority based this finding on the amendment's pre-
amble, which explicitly stated that it was designed to limit terms, there-
by creating a qualification not contained in the Qualifications
Clauses.2"9 Yet, term limit amendments in other states have preambles
evidencing voters' intent "to assure that members of the United States
Congress... are representative of and responsive to... citizens."2'
The Constitution itself calls a House member a "Representative,""2
and the Qualifications Clauses require both House and Senate members
to be citizens of the state where they are chosen.2 Thus, the intent of
any term limit amendment could be to ensure that federal representa-
tives meet these qualifications.2" Because the Court decided that the
216. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 471 (1991).
217. Hills, supra note 24, at 138-39 (discussing the "election before the election"
theory).
218. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1867.
219. Id. at 1867-68.
220. CoL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 9(a) (emphasis added).
221. U.S. CONsT. art I, § 2.
222. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
223. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (holding
that states must protect their interests not through the Tenth Amendment, but
through the federal political process). It should be noted that a vocal three member
dissent in the Garcia case stated that one of the reasons they believed that the stan-
dard adopted by the majority was unworkable was because of political changes over
the past 30 years making members of Congress less "representative" of their constitu-
ents. Id. at 565 n.9 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Hills, supra note 24, at 136-38
(arguing that congressional term limits provide a "safeguard" ensuring that members
Arkansas term limit amendment was not the type of restriction permit-
ted under the Times, Places and Manner Clause, it never even consid-
ered the usual test for ballot access cases under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments-weighing the burden placed on the candidate
against the interest of the state.'
The majority also stated that if term limits were a manner of regulat-
ing elections, then Congress would have the power, under Article I, to
make or alter the limits, which is contrary to Powell's holding that Con-
gress did not. have the power to set its own qualifications.' If term
limits are a manner of regulating elections under the Times, Places, and
Manner Clause, however, then they are not a qualification under the
Qualifications Clauses. Although Powell said Congress could not set its
own qualifications, Congress does retain the right to alter the manner of
its elections. 6
Voters enacted Amendment 73 in an election and as the majority
stated, "'[tihe power over the manner only enables ... [the states] to
of Congress meet the state residency requirement contained in the Constitution). The
Framers themselves felt the residency requirement was essential, reasoning that if a
representative did not live in the area in which he represented, he could not have an
accurate understanding of the area's concerns. Id. at 151 n.166.
224. See Killenbeck & Sheppard, supra note 8, at 1127 n.15 (stating the Court may
never reach the First Amendment analysis for congressional term limits in U.S. Term
Limits if the case is decided on other constitutional grounds, such as the Qualifica-
tions Clauses); suprm notes 49-72 and accompanying text (explaining the weighing of
the "interests versus the burden" test and the history surrounding the test). Although
the Supreme Court has never applied the balancing test to term limits, even to those
imposed on state and local officials, lower courts deciding challenges to such limits
have found the benefit to the "over-all health of the body politic" outweighs the bur-
den on officials disqualified from running under the limits. See Maloney v. McCartney,
223 S.E.2d 607, 611 (W. Va), appeal dismissed, 425 U.S. 946 (1976); see also
Miyazawa v. Cincinnati, 825 F. Supp. 816, 822 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (holding term limits
on city officials consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments), ofjfd, 45 F.3d
126 (6th Cir. 1995); Legislature of California v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309 (Cal. 1991) (holding
that state constitutional amendment limiting state elected legislative officials survived
the Anderson balancing test), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 119 (1992); Maddox v. Fortson,
172 S.E.2d 595 (Ga.) (holding that Georgia's term limit for its governor was consis-
tent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 149 (1970).
For a full discussion of how quasi-term linits would be treated under the balancing
test, see Sean R. Sullivan, Comment, A Term Limit By Any Other Name?: The Con-
stitutionality of State-Enacted Ballot Access Restrictions on Incumbent Members of
Congress, 56 U. Prrr. L REv. 845, 873-879 (1995). Ironically, the lower court in U.S.
Term Limits upheld the absolute term limit that Amendment 73 placed on state-
elected officials, which was not challenged in the U.S. Supreme Court. See U.S. Term
Limits v. Hill, 872 S.W.2d 349, 360 (Ark. 1994), affd sub nom. U.S. Term Limits, 115
S. Ct at 1842.
225. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1869.
226. See id.
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determine how these electors shall elect-whether by ballot, or by vote,
or by any other way.'"'  The majority did not recognize that Arkansas
voters merely exercised a manner of holding elections when they deter-
mined incumbents could not appear on the ballot.'
As for the majority's reliance on historical evidence, it acknowledged,
but discounted, that when the First Congress met, several states had
additional requirements on their federal representatives.' Neverthe-
less, the majority failed to note that the First Congress did not exercise
its power to alter these qualifications, and thus, this Congress must
have either believed that it had no power to alter them (thus the Claus-
es are not exclusive), or that the Times, Places and Manner Clause
permitted them.'
Finally, the majority attempted to distinguish between procedural
restrictions that the Court allowed under the Clauses in Storer v.
Brown," and substantive regulations, such as term limits, which are
not allowed.' In doing so, they explicitly reaffirmed the notion that
states are free to adopt "'generally applicable and evenhanded restric-
tions that protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process it-
self.'"'  First, as to protecting the integrity of elections, the Court at
one point cited to Amendment 73's preamble,' which in addition to
the "term limit" language that the majority focused upon, also stated
227. Id, (quoting John Steele at the North Carolina ratification convention, in 4 DE-
BATES, supra note 48, at 71).
228. See supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of voters
themselves enacting Amendment 73 on the amendment's validity).
229. US. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1865-66 (noting that several states required
Congress members to be property holders, and several other states imposed district
residency requirements); see also supra notes 121-22, 175-77 and accompanying text
(summarizing the majority's opinion on the additional requirements).
230. See Brief for the State Petitioner at 43-44, US. Term Limits (Nos. 93-1456, 93-
1828). Furthermore, as of the date of the U.S. Term Limits decision, many of the
then-present state congressional term limit measures had been in force for over two
years, and Congress had done nothing to alter these limits. See Petitioner's Reply
Brief at 10, US. Term Limits (Nos. 93-1456, 93-1828).
231. 415 U.S. 724 (1974). For a complete discussion of Storer, see supra notes 50-
57 and accompanying text.
232. US. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1869-70. It is interesting to note that
Antifederalists at the Constitutional Convention did not feel the Clause was limited to
procedural matters, and instead felt it extended to substantive matters also. Hills,
supra note 24, at 151 n.46.
233. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. CL at 1870 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S.
780, 788 n.9 (1983)).
234. lId at 1868.
that "'[ejntrenched incumbency has reduced voter participation and has
led to an electoral system that is less free, less competitive, and less
representative than the system established by the Founding Fa-
thers.'"' These very words show that Arkansas voters no longer have
faith in, nor believe in, the integrity of the electoral process.' Sec-
ond, as to protecting the reliability of elections, incumbents have a
remarkable number of government sponsored resources at their dispos-
al, 37 and "[ellections in which one side is heavily subsidized by the
government are poor indicators of actual popularity." ' Furthermore,
term limits protect the residency requirement, an enumerated qualifica-
tion of the Clauses.'
In fact, the only difference that the majority cited between the re-
quirement in Storer and the Arkansas amendment was that the Storer
requirement did not exclude candidates "without reference to the candi-
date's support in the election process. " "4° Yet, as explained above, the
term limits of Amendment 73 were enacted by a majority vote, thereby
excluding candidates based on the support of incumbents in the elec-
tion process."4 The majority employed circular reasoning, fumbling
that the requirement in Storer was not a qualification because it was
procedural, and that it was procedural because it was not a qualifica-
tion."4
235. Id. at 1845 (quoting Arkansas Amendment 73).
236. See Killenbeck & Sheppard, supra note 8, at 1133-34 (discussing how the lan-
guage of term limit amendments, including the Arkansas amendment, shows the lack
of faith voters have in the current election system). Killenbeck and Sheppard believe
term limits are actually a procedural regulation, much like a district residency re-
quirement, and not a substantive regulation. Id. at 1158-64.
237. See supra note 5 (listing incumbents' government resources); see also U.S.
Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1911 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing the electoral
advantages of incumbency).
238. Hills, supra note 24, at 147.
239. Id. at 137-38; see also supra notes 220-23 and accompanying text (arguing that
term limits enforce the residency and "Representative" requirements in the Constitu-
tion).
240. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1870.
241. See supra notes 216-17, 227-28 and accompanying text (discussing voters' right
to decide how to elect officials).
242. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct at 1870. Indeed, the distinction is largely "one of
semantics." Vance, supra note 7, at 446. It is interesting to note that although over
half of the oral arguments during U.S. Term Limits centered on the difference be-
tween a qualification and an allowable procedural restriction, see Official Transcript
of Oral Argument at 4-6, 8, 11-13, 16-18, 20-22, 24, U.S. Term Limits (Nos. 93-1456,
93-1828), available in 1994 WESTLAW 714634, only four pages of the majority's 24-
page opinion dealt with the possibility that the Arkansas amendment could be a pro-
cedural restriction. See U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1866-70. During the oral argu-
ment, even the Respondents seemed confused as to the definition of a qualification.
At one point, the Respondents said the Arkansas amendment was not a qualification
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VI. IMPACT
The majority's ruling in U.S. Term Limits will not only impact the
status of term limits, but the validity of other state election laws, and
other areas of the law and government.
A. The Status of Term Limits
The majority's holding immediately invalidates congressional term
limit amendments and statutes enacted prior to U.S. Term Limits.m
Nevertheless, several of these amendments contain provisions stating
that if term limits are found to be unconstitutional, it is the duty of
every incumbent congressional candidate to keep these voter-enacted
term limits in mind when making the decision to run again.2 "
Colorado voters enacted a "term limit" amendment significantly dif-
ferent than the one invalidated by the court in U.S. Term Limits."6
Thus, the question arises whether it, too, requires a constitutional
amendment to remain valid." Although the Colorado amendment
more closely resembles the "resign to run" statutes previously upheld
by the Court, 7 the majority's reliance on the preamble of the Arkan-
or a ballot restriction, but rather "a third something-or-other," and at another point
claimed the amendment was a qualification because it was a "burden placed on a
Candidate for Congress based upon conduct that has not occurred during the [pres-
ent] election cycle." Official Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, 20 US. Term Limits
(Nos. 93-1456, 93-1828), available in 1994 WESTLAW 714634. Nonetheless, in response
to questioning from the Court, the Respondents conceded the amendment was not a
qualification. Id. at 17-18.
243. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (giving examples of these various
term limit statutes). As the majority stated, "allowing the several States to adopt term
limits... would effect a fundamental change in the constitutional framework Any
such change must come . . . through the Amendment procedures set forth in Article
V." US. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1871.
244. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. 1l, § 10 ("The people of Michigan declare that...
their intention is that federal officials elected from Michigan will continue voluntarily
to observe the wishes of the people as stated in this section, in the event any provi-
sion of this section is held invalid."). Yet, what may really matter is if voters keep
these limits in mind when an incumbent does not give deference to the amendment
and still chooses to run.
245. COLO. CONsT. art. XVIII, § 9(a)(l).
246. The Colorado amendment prohibits United States Senators from serving more
than two consecutive terms, and United States representatives from serving six con-
secutive terms. Id, A term is consecutive if it is less then four years after a previous
term. Id.
247. See Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 967 (1982) (plurality opinion) (declaring
sas amendment and the importance placed on the Framers' rejection of
rotation for members of Congress indicate the Colorado measure will
meet the same fate.'
Besides manipulating, as did Colorado, the technical operation of the
term limit amendment itself, states could try another approach to term
limits by legislating the definition of a state "resident" and exclude
those, like Congress members, who spend more than six months of the
year out of the state.'4
As the majority stated, the only sure way to enact valid term limits
would be by constitutional amendment, but unfortunately, a term limit
amendment failed to receive the necessary votes for ratification in Con-
gress just months before the Court decided U.S. Term Limits.25
Along these lines, another possibility would be a less stringent (and
therefore maybe more popular) amendment, granting the states the
power to individually decide whether to adopt term limits.25 '
At a lower level, states with constitutions containing qualifications
clauses for their state representatives and executives which are worded
the requirement that state justices of the peace serve out their terms before appear-
ing on the ballot, which amounts to a two-year waiting period, a "de minimis" burden
on candidacy). Both the Colorado and Clements enactments required a waiting period,
instead of a complete ban, before candidates could appear on the ballot or serve in
office. Hills, supra note 24, at 148-49. The majority expressly stated the Clements
decision is still valid after U.S. Term Limits. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1870
n.48.
248. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1859, 1867-68. Unfortunately for Colorado vot-
ers, the measure uses the words "limitations on terms," similar to the language of the
Arkansas amendment CoLO. CONST. art. XVII, § 9(a)(1); see also supra note 220 and
accompanying text (discussing the preamble to the Colorado amendment).
249. Senator Hank Brown, a Republican from Colorado, has already proposed such
a bill on the federal level Holly Ideison, Constitutional Amendment: Ruling Pres-
sures Congress to Address Term Limits, CONG. Q. WKLY. REP., May 31, 1995, at 1479,
1482. The Qualifications Clauses already contain a state residency requirement, U.S.
CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3, and if passed at the state level, the federal government must
yield to the states' definition of "resident" See US. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1888
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing James Madison's statement, prior to national legis-
lation of naturalization, that state law must be used to determine whether or not a
Congressman-elect was indeed a "citizen"); see also Martson v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679
(1973) (upholding Arizona statute mandating 50-day residency requirement for voters).
But see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (invalidating Tennessee state law
requiring voters to be residents for one year).
250. Paul Barrett & Gerald Seib, Term Limits Are Set Back By High Court, WALL
ST. J., May 23, 1995, at A3. Although receiving an absolute majority, the amendment
failed by 61 votes to get the two-thirds majority needed for submission to the states
of constitutional amendments. Id.
251. See Adreil Bettelheim, Term Limit Idea Originated in Colorado, DENVER POST,
March 30, 1995, at A17 (noting that one Senator contemplated introducing a bill giv-
ing states this right).
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similarly to those in the United States Constitution now risk their state
term limits being declared unconstitutional under the state's constitu-
tion.252
B. Other State Election Laws
The Court's holding will also impact state election laws beyond those
only involving term limits because the majority held that any law handi-
capping a class of candidates "that has the sole purpose of creating
additional qualifications indirectly" will be unconstitutional. 53 As not-
ed by the dissent, it is unclear if this standard replaces the First and
Fourteenth Amendment standards, or simply adds a new standard, for
evaluating state statutes involving congressional candidates.m Several
states currently have laws disqualifying, and thus under the majority's
reasoning, handicapping, candidates who are mentally incompetent,
have been convicted of voter fraud, are in jail, or are ineligible to
vote.'s The question revolves around what the Court will now define
252. See, e.g., Bradley Tilt, Recent Legislative Developments in Utah Law, 1994
UTAH L REV. 1571, 1619-20 (1994) (arguing that if the Court struck down the Arkan-
sas amendment, Utah's term limits on state officials would face similar challenge in
state courts). Tilt suggests the Utah courts would find the qualifications clauses in
Utah's constitution exclusive based on their past use of the maxim expressio unius
est exclusio atterius ("the inclusion of one thing implies the exclusion of another")
argument, discussed supra note 153. See Tilt, supra, at 1619 n.43.
253. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1871.
254. See id. at 1913 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent also questioned whether
these cases would withstand the "handicap" standard of the majority. Id. (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); see also Lowenstein, supra note 23, at 59-60 (maintaining that if 'the
Court struck down quasi-term limits as a "qualification" this would confuse the defini-
tion of a "qualification"); Sullivan, supra note 224, at 867-68 (arguing that if the Court
adopted a broad definition of qualification, one which would include quasi-term limits,
it would create an "unmanageable standard" for review of state election laws); supra
notes 49-78 and accompanying text (discussing previous standards used by the Court
in determining the constitutionality of state election laws).
255. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 97.041(1)(a) (1991) (disqualifying candidates found to be
mentally incompetent); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 21-2-5, 21-2-8 (1993 & Supp. 1995) (disquali-
fying candidates convicted of voter fraud); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 10, § 5/3-5 (West
1993 & Supp. 1995) (disqualifying persons currently in prison from voting); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 17-14-1.2 (1988) (allowing only those "qualified to vote" to be candidates).
Yet, when similar measures in other states have been challenged in the past, the
lower courts have invalidated them using a Qualifications Clauses argument. See U.S.
Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1852-53 (listing similar state restrictions that have been
struck down by lower courts on Qualifications Clauses arguments); Brief for Respon-
dent Congressman Ray Thornton at 19-20, U.S. Term Limits (Nos. 93-1456, 93-1828)
as a "qualification" handicapping a class of candidates versus what is a
procedure or "manner of elections" handicapping a class of candi-
dates."M
C. Other Areas of the Law and Government
As noted in the Analysis section, the Court made an affirmative state-
ment regarding states' power, beyond their ability to alter a Congress
member's qualifications, under the Tenth Amendment. 7 The actual
impact of this statement is uncertain-the majority argued it simply
articulated a previously understood concept, but as evidenced by the
closeness of the decision, this is far from clear.2" Indeed, the decision
could mean a nominee's views concerning the Tenth Amendment and
states' rights may become the litmus test for confirmation as a Supreme
Court Justice.2"
The decision leaves states wondering what powers they retain, at a
time when not just the states, but the voters and the federal govern-
ment, are questioning the expansive nature of federal power in enacting
federal programs.2" Many of these programs involve "strings-attached
legislation, which promises money to the states on condition that they
do certain things, or unfunded mandates, which require state programs
but provide no money to pay for them.""' Under the majority's expan-
sive Tenth Amendment holding, it is questionable if states will have the
ability to challenge such legislation.2"
(listing federal circuit and state court decisions striking down such provisions when
challenged under the Qualifications Clauses).
256. See supra notes 127-30 (discussing majority's definition of a procedural versus
substantive qualification).
257. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text (discussing majority's Tenth
Amendment holding).
258. The four Justices dissented because they felt "the majority fundamentally
misunderst[ood] the notion of 'reserved' powers." U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct at
1875 (Thomas, J., dissenting). But see William H. Freivogel, Term Limits Ruling Re-
kindles States' Rights Debate, Prrrs. POsr-GAZErE, May 28, 1995, at A10 ("'It's obvi-
ously a very important case but in terms of its consequences, it is not a very impor-
tant one.'") (quoting University of California at Berkeley law professor Jesse Choper).
259. Linda Greenhouse, Term Limits Ruling Another Step In Constitution Debate,
MORNING NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma, Wa.), May 28, 1995, at D1.
260. See, e.g., Holly Idelson, Constitutional Amendment: States' Rights Loses in
Close Vote, CONG. Q. WKLY. REP., May 31, 1995, at 1480 (explaining that "[tihe case
reached the high court at a time when Congress is re-examining the balance of pow-
er between Washington and state capitals"); see also Frantz, supra note 197, at 187-88
(stating that "the Court's decision in US. Term Limits will remain as damaging pre-
cedent in future cases concerning the scope of the Federal Government's power").
261. Aaron Epstein, High Court Shifting Toward States' Rights, LA. DAILY NEWS,
May 28, 1995, at Ni, NiS.
262. See, e.g., Voting Rights Coalition v. Wilson, 60 F.3d 1411, 1415 (9th Cir. 1995);
[Vol. 24: 649, 1997] U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton
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The decision also creates uncertainty as to what defines a democratic
principle when voters adopt a measure through a seemingly democratic
process and the Court then declares .the process undemocratic.2"
Moreover, to voters not well-versed in the history of the Constitution,
the Court's decision seems to oppose fundamental beliefs underlying
the American political process.'
VII. CONCLUSION
The Court's holding in U.S. Term Limits that states may not impose
term limits on federal representatives2' hardly seems earth shattering.
It is the means the Court used to come to this conclusion that makes
the decision notable.
Both the majority and the dissenters relied heavily upon historical
evidence to support their reasoning. Yet, the closeness of the decision
shows that the historical evidence is "inconclusive," and thus another
standard should have been used to determine the constitutionality of
the Arkansas amendment.2"
The majority of the Court felt otherwise and reached three conclu-
sions based upon its interpretation of the historical evidence. First,
states do not have the power under the Tenth Amendment to enact
congressional term limits.267 Second, the Arkansas term limits imposed
a qualification barred by the exclusivity of the Qualifications Clauses
Association of Community Orgs. for Reform Now v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791, 794 (7th Cir.
1995). In these cases, both courts cited U.S. Term Limits to support their reasoning
that states must abide by the terms of the "Motor Voter Act" passed by Congress.
The Act requires states to register voters when they apply for a driver's license, but
provides no funds for this process.
263. See supra notes 216-17, 227-28, 241 and accompanying text (discussing the
effect of voters enacting the amendment through elections as opposed to the govern-
ment enacting the amendment through legislation.).
264. See Levy, supra note 186, at 1916 (noting that recent opinion surveys found
over 7096 "of the American people believe term limits would improve the political sys-
tem") (footnote omitted).
265. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1871.
266. See Killenbeck & Sheppard, supra note 8, at 1127-28 (discussing overall rele-
vance of historical evidence surrounding the framing of the Constitution); see also
supra note 186 (discussing history of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence). As this Note
has pointed out, the reasoning of the majority in U.S. Term Limits and of the Court
in prior decisions actually supports what the voters were trying to accomplish with
Amendment 73. See supra notes 198-242 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
contained in Article I of the Constitution.2" Finally, the majority felt
term limits could not survive as a regulation of congressional elections
under the Times, Places, and Manner Clause.2'
The effect of the holding goes beyond merely invalidating term limits
imposed by states on their federal representatives.27 Not only does
the language used by the Court make any attempt to circumvent the
Court's reasoning practically impossible, but the rationale may also call
into question the validity of term limits imposed by states on their own
state representatives."' Furthermore, states must now fear having
election laws unrelated to term limits invalidated under the majority's
new handicapping standard for evaluating these statutes.2" The deci-
sion may also have serious implications for states trying to free them-
selves from economically burdensome federal programs; namely, the
Court's narrow Tenth Amendment interpretation may have left states
with limited avenues of redress.2"
Finally, unfortunately for voters and the political process itself, the
majority's reasoning and ultimate decision leaves chickens unable to
vote for Colonel Sanders, and challengers without the powerful tool of
term limits to use against incumbents.
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268. See supra notes 110-23 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 124-31 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 252-64 and accompanying text.
271. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 253-56 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 257-62 and accompanying text.
